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In McDonald v. Smith1 the Supreme Court faced the type of challenge
long threatened by the Reagan administration-an argument that one of
the Warren Court's landmark decisions, together with much of its intellec-
tual progeny, was inconsistent with the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The decision called into question was New York Times v.
Stillivan,2 which had held that the first amendment permitted state courts to
award libel judgments to public figures only if there was clear proof that the
libel defendant knew that his statements were false, or had acted in reckless
disregard of the truth of those remarks. 3 New York Times v. Sullivan had long
been a favorite target of conservative theorists. 4 In McDonald v. Smith,
however, the historical criticism came not from the libel plaintiff, but from
the defendant, who argued that New York Times v. Sullivan provided too
little constitutional protection, rather than too much, when the alleged libel
was contained in a petition for redress of grievances.
The litigation in McDonald arose as a result of the proposed selection
of David Smith as United States Attorney for North Carolina. Robert
McDonald, the operator of several child-care centers in the state, wrote
letters opposing Smith's selection to then President-elect Reagan, as well as
to Presidential adviser Edwin Meese, the Director of the FBI, and four
members of Congress.5 McDonald accused Smith of "violating the civil
rights of various individuals while a Superior Court Judge," "fraud," and
"violations of professional ethics," 6 and referred to a number of specific
incidents which McDonald claimed substantiated his allegations. 7 After
another candidate was selected as U.S. Attorney, Smith sued McDonald for
libel, alleging that McDonald's charges had cost him the job, injured his
professional reputation, and caused him "humiliation, embarrassment,
*Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in Law,
Columbia University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. Phil. 1965, Oxford
University; LL.B. 1968, Yale University. In this Article, the capitalization of material quoted
from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English cases and treatises has been changed to
conform with modern American English usage.
1. 472 U.S. 479 (1985). The only commentary on McDonald is in Smith, "Shall Make No
Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1153 (1986).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 279-80.
4. See B. FEiN, NEW YORK TuiEs v. SuLLivA,: AN OBSTACLE TO ENLIGHTENED PUBLIc DiscouRsE AND
GOVERNM.-ENT RESPONsIVENESS TO THE PEOPLE 3-6 (Am. Legal Found. 1984).
5. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 481 & nn.1-2.
6. Id. at 481.
7. Joint Appendix at 8-16, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-476).
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anxiety and mental anguish."8 Smith did not claim that McDonald had
shown the letter to anyone but the seven federal officials to whom it had
been sent, or that he had repeated the allegations to anyone else; evidently
those charges became known to the public only when Smith brought his
libel action.
Smith filed his action in state court, and McDonald removed the
proceeding to federal district court. The district court and the fourth circuit
agreed that McDonald's letters fell within the scope of the petition clause of
the first amendment, 9 but held that a defendant could be mulct in damages
for submitting a petition for redress of grievances if a plaintiff could prove
that the petition contained an inaccurate statement and that the defendant
either knew the statement was false or had acted in reckless disregard of the
truth.' 0
McDonald contended in the Supreme Court that libel actions could
never be founded on the contents of a petition, but the Court unanimously
rejected that argument. Both the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger
and a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan emphasized that New York
Times v. Sullivan had established for ordinary speech a lesser, nonabsolute
protection from libel suits." Chief Justice Burger argued "[t]o accept
petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to
special First Amendment status.' 2 Justice Brennan noted that according
absolute immunity to petitions, rather than merely creating a minor
exception to the rule in New York Times v. Sullivan, would substantially alter
the constitutional principles applicable to libel actions, since "the Petition
Clause embraces a... broader... range of communications addressed to
the executive, the legislature, courts, and administrative agencies... [and]
includes such activities as peaceful protest demonstrations,"' 3 and that such
absolute immunity for petitions would have encompassed the very state-
ments at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan itself.14
Both the majority and concurring opinions in McDonald concluded
that there was no historical basis for McDonald's contention that the
framers understood the right to petition to include an unqualified right to
do so without being subject to suit for libel. 15 This Article argues that the
historical analysis in McDonald is incorrect; indeed, this appears to be one
instance in which the relevant historical materials are both voluminous and
8. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 481 (quoting Joint Appendix at 6, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S.
479 (1985) (No. 84-476)).
9. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging... the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Coxsr. amend. 1.
10. See Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 843 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (establishing these
requirements to show actual malice); see also Smith v. McDonald, 737 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.
1984) (holding libel plaintiff recovers damages by showing express malice).
11. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484-85; id. at 486-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 485; see also id. at 490 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("There is no persuasive reason
for according greater or lesser protection to expression on matters of public importance
depending on whether the expression consists of speaking to neighbors across the backyard
fence, publishing an editorial in the local newspaper, or sending a letter to the President of the
United States.").
13. Id. at 488 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 489 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 484; id. at 488 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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crystal clear. Part I evaluates the McDonald Court's discussion of the intent
of the framers. 16 Subsequent sections discuss the wide variety of materials
that the Court failed to consider; Part II explains the origins of the petition
clause in England's 1689 Bill of Rights, 17 Part III summarizes the pre-1791
case law holding that a libel action could not be founded on the contents of
a petition,' 8 and Part IV sets forth the discussion of the same issue in
eighteenth century legal tracts. 19 Part V discusses the specific right to
petition within the broad context of the first amendment.2° The Article
concludes that the degree of protection from libel suits now accorded to
criticism of government conduct is seriously deficient and significantly
weaker than existed in 1791.21
I. THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN MCDONALD
The decision in McDonald suffers on its face from two distinct
infirmities. First, the opinion does not even purport to discuss any
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century materials that might reveal the con-
temporaneous understanding of the petition clause, but relies instead solely
on postratification materials. Second, McDonald creates an unjustifiable
distinction in the treatment of libel suits between public officials and private
citizens. When an official and a citizen exchange derogatory and arguably
inaccurate public attacks on one another, the official is virtually immune
from any libel action-even if the official deliberately lied-but is entitled to
pursue just such an action against his or her private critic. This distinction,
under a constitutional system which sanctifies both free speech and the
democratic process, seems anomalous if not bizarre.
Probably the most provocative line in McDonald is to be found in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, which noted that he "agree[d] with
the Court that the evidence concerning 17th- and 18th-century British and
colonial practice reveals, at most, 'conflicting views of the privilege afforded
expressions in petitions to government officials' . . . and does not persua-
sively demonstrate the Framers' intent to accord absolute immunity to
petitioning. '2 2 The difficulty with this observation can be simply stated-
neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinion contain any
reference whatever to colonial practice, or to eighteenth-century British
libel law.23 The sole reference to seventeenth-century libel law was a citation
to Lake v. King,24 which squarely held that statements in petitions were
absolutely privileged.2 5 Justice Brennan declined to discuss Lake v. King,
16. See infra text accompanying notes 22-72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 73-155.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 156-208.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 209-36.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 237-49.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 250-54.
22. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 488 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority, id. at 483).
23. The Court noted that as late as the 1790s the right to petition was still under attack in
England. Id. at 484 n.5. The attack at issue, however, had nothing to do with the extent, if any,
to which a petition could give rise to a libel action.
24. 1 Wms. Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1668-69).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 185-92.
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and the majority expressly refused to follow it.25
Justice Brennan's inaccurate description of the majority opinion is
significant because the opinion correctly recognized the best guides to the
original understanding of the framers, at least in those instances when a
clear understanding can be said to have existed. Other than their own
contemporaneous remarks, the framers' intent would ordinarily be evalu-
ated by reference to the body of law, theory, and historical practice with
which the framers were likely familiar and which they could fairly be
assumed to have had in mind when they drafted and approved the
Constitution and Bill of Rights. The decision in McDonald actually relied
instead on a handful of nineteenth-century authorities, particularly the
Supreme Court's 1845 decision in White v. Nicholls.27 Such postratification
materials are necessarily of decidedly lesser weight than documents that
might have been read by or known to the framers. Nineteenth-century
authorities may nonetheless be of use in two distinct ways. First, if they
directly address the meaning of a constitutional provision and were written
at the very outset of the century, they may fairly reflect the understanding
of the generation that participated in the framing of the provision
involved.28 Second, even if written later in the nineteenth century, such
later authorities may be useful in identifying historical materials that
shaped the understanding of the framers, since those materials were often
more familiar to judges and scholars of the last century than to those of our
own.
But neither White v. Nicholls nor any of the other nineteenth century
authorities cited in McDonald are of such significance to the interpretation
of the petition clause. White itself was decided in 1845, some 54 years after
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, far too late to reflect any contemporane-
ous understanding. The McDonald Court, noting that White had character-
ized Lake v. King as "anomalous," implied that White had somehow
purported to provide guidance as to the state of the law and the intent of
the framers in 1791:
26. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483 n.4.
27. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
There is a significant possibility that the decision in White was affected by extraneous
considerations. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century the controversies
regarding the right to petition were the central battleground between abolitionists and
proponents of slavery. The abolitionists deluged Congress with large numbers of petitions,
using the petition-signing campaign to win over public opinion as well as to attempt to
influence Congress. The proslavery officials responded by imposing in the House and Senate
a "gag" rule against consideration of the petitions and by prosecuting individuals who
circulated them in slave states; Southerners denounced the abolitionist petitions as deliberate
acts of sedition. See G. BAuPxts, THE A-i-SLAVERY IMPULSE 1830-1844, at 110-96 (1964); W.
WECEK, THE SOURcEs or A.-rsLkvERv CoxsrrrtUroxAus.N i.N AMERICA 1760-1864, at 183-87 (1977);
Note, A Short Histoiy of the Right to Petition Goverzvient for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Y.LE L.J.
142, 158-65 (1986). A decision in White according absolute protection to petitions would have
been a major legal and moral victory for the abolitionists. The Supreme Court in this era had
little sympathy for the abolitionist cause. Justice Daniels of Virginia, who wrote White, was "the
extreme defender of states' rights, and ... the extreme sectionalist and radical partisan in the
slavery question." I THE JescCEs or THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1978, at 800 (L. Friedman & F.
Israel ed. 1980).
28. Cf. L. LEvy, EMIERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 280 (1985) (arguing postratification material
unacceptable as evidence of framers' intent).
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In White v. Nicholls . . . this Court dealt with the proper
common-law privilege for petitions to the Government.... The
Court, after reviewing the common law, concluded that the
defendant's petition was actionable if prompted by "express
malice," which was defined as "falsehood and the absence of
probable cause." . . . Nothing presented to us suggests that the
Court's decision not to recognize an absolute privilege in 1845
should be altered; we are not prepared to conclude, 140 years
later, that the Framers of the First Amendment understood the
right to petition to include an unqualified right to express
damaging falsehoods in the exercise of that right.29
Although nothing in this passage is an outright falsehood, all of the
implications which make it relevant to McDonald are in fact misleading.
First, White did not purport to make any comment about the intent of the
framers of the first amendment. Second, White pretended neither to
interpret, nor even to mention, the first amendment. Third, although
rejecting the holding in Lake, White did not assert that Lake was bad law in
1791, and did not claim to be expounding the state of the common law in
the late eighteenth century. On the contrary, White criticized Lake as
inconsistent with "the modem adjudications of the courts"; 0 whatever
"modem" may have meant in 1845, it certainly would not have been
understood to refer to judicial decisions then at least fifty-four years old.
The quotation from McDonald set out above also deliberately ignored
the actual basis of the decision in White. The plaintiff in White premised his
argument on the assumption that a libel action could be based on
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, so long as the libel
plaintiff could prove that the statements had been made with malice.3'
Against that background, the central argument which was made by the
plaintiff in White, and which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in that
case, was that the degree of protection for petitions and for assertions
relating to judicial proceedings should be the same.3 2 The Court in White
agreed that statements made in connection with judicial proceedings would
be actionable if made with malice: "With respect to words used in a course
of judicial proceeding, it has been ruled that they are protected by the
occasion, and cannot form the foundation of an action for slander without
proof of express malice . . . ,,33 The absolute privilege for petitions
recognized by Lake, the Court in White concluded, was "anomalous" solely
because it was different from, and would have been greater than, the
privilege for statements in court:
[Lake v. King is in] conflict with the current of authorities going to
maintain the position that express malice cannot be shielded by
any judicial forms. ... The Parliament, it is said, is a court, and it
is difficult to perceive how malicious and groundless prosecutions
before it can be placed on a ground of greater impunity than they
29. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted).
30. White, 44 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 279-80 (argument for plaintiff in error).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 287.
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can occupy in another appropriate forum. The case of Lake v.
King, therefore, interpreted by the known principles of the law of
libel, would extend the privilege of the defendant no farther than
to require as to him proof of actual malice. A different interpre-
tation would establish, as to such a case, a rule that is perfectly
anomalous, and depending upon no reason which is applicable to
other cases privilege. 34
Having established that the degree of privilege accorded to petitions and to
judicial proceedings ought to be the same, White then held that that
privilege consisted solely in the rule that malice could not be presumed, but
had to the proven.35
The actual reasoning in White, equating the privilege accorded to
judicial proceedings and to petitions, was critical to the issue in McDonald.
White would have supported the result in McDonald if in 1985, as in 1845,
the Supreme Court believed that the privilege for judicial proceedings was
only the limited protection recognized in White. But on repeated occasions
prior to McDonald the Supreme Court had expressly disavowed White's
treatment of the protection accorded to judicial proceedings and had held
that in that situation the privilege against libel actions was indeed absolute.
These disavowals were not based on any intervening developments in the
law, but on the Court's conclusion that White had misstated the law as it
existed in the mid-nineteenth century regarding statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings. In 1895 the Court held that a line of
decisions "extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present time"
protected ajudge from any action for slander based on words spoken from
the bench36 and cited a nineteenth-century English decision for the
34. Id. at 289-90.
35. The Court's conclusions about the limited scope of the privilege for petitions and
assertions made in judicial proceeding are set forth below:
1. That every publication... which charges upon or imputes to any person that which
renders him liable to punishment, or which is calculated to make him infamous, or
odious, or ridiculous, is prima fade a libel, and implies malice in the author and
publisher towards the person concerning whom such publication is made.... 2. That
the description of cases recognised as privileged communications, must be under-
stood as exceptions to this rule, and as being founded upon some apparently
recognised obligation or motive, legal, moral, or social, which may fairly be presumed
to have led to the publication, and therefore prima facie relieves it from that just
implication from which the general rule of law is deduced. The rule of evidence, as
to such cases, is accordingly so far changed as to impose it on the plaintiff to remove
those presumptions flowing from the seeming obligations and situations of the
parties, and to require of him to bring home to the defendant the existence of malice
as the true motive of his conduct. Beyond this extent no presumption can be
permitted to operate, much less be made to sanctify the indulgence of malice,
however wicked, however express, under the protection of legal forms. We conclude
then that malice may be proved, though alleged to have existed in the proceeding
before a court, or legislative body, or any other tribunal or authority, although such
court, legislative body, or other tribunal, may have been the appropriate authority for
redressing the grievance presented to it; and that proof of express malice in any
written publication, petition, or proceeding, addressed to such tribunal, will render
that publication, petition, or proceeding, libellous in its character, and actionable, and
will subject the author and publisher thereof to all the consequences of libel.
Id. at 291-92.
36. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495 (1896).
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proposition that counsel, witnesses, and parties were also absolutely im-
mune "for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceed-
ing before any court or tribunal recognized by law."37 The Supreme Court
reiterated that principle in 1976: "In the law of defamation, a concern for
the airing of all evidence has resulted in an absolute privilege for any
courtroom statement relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding."3 8
The Supreme Court cited as "the leading case" a Massachusetts decision
handed down in 1841, four years before White.39 Most recently, in Briscoe v.
Lahue,40 decided barely two years before McDonald, the Supreme Court
dismissed White's rejection of absolute immunity for statements in judicial
proceedings as "not . . . a reliable statement of the common law," noting
that even in the mid-nineteenth century, White was generally regarded as
wrongly decided.41 Under these circumstances, the central issue in McDon-
ald was whether, as White had held a century earlier, and as McDonald
argued,42 the degree of privilege accorded to petitions would be the same
as that relating to judicial proceedings. By according a lesser degree of
protection to petitions, the Supreme Court in McDonald actually rejected
the reasoning of White, and created precisely the "anomaly" of differing
standards that White had condemned.
The other citations in McDonald fare no better. Emphasizing that the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights contained a right to petition for redress
of grievances, 43 McDonald quoted at length the 1815 Pennsylvania decision
in Gray v. Pentland,44 which held that malicious aspersions on the character
of a plaintiff were actionable even though the defendant had voiced that
criticism to the governor in a petition seeking the removal of that plaintiff
from public office.45 But Gray did not, as McDonald suggested, provide
"evidence of the nature of the right to petition as it existed at the time the
First Amendment was adopted." 46 The right to petition for redress of
grievances embodied in the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was ex-
pressly applicable only to petitions filed with the state legislature and did
not extend to petitions submitted to the governor.47 That state guarantee,
understandably, was neither relied on by the defendant in Gray nor
mentioned in that opinion.48
37. Id. at 497 (quoting Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255, 263 (1873), af/'d L.R.- E.
& I. App. 7 H.L. 744, 754 (1875)).
38. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 n.23 (1976).
39. Id. (citing Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 193, 197-98 (1841)).
40. 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
41. Id. at 332-33 n.12.
42. Brief for Petitioner at 29, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-476).
43. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483.
44. 2 Serg. & Rawle 23 (Pa. 1815).
45. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483-84.
46. Id. at 483.
47. PENN. DECL. or RIGHrs art. XVI (1776). "That the people have a right to assemble
together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to
the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance." 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
THE RoOrs Or THE Biu. or RIGH-s 266 (1980).
48. The state court in Gray, like the United States Supreme Court in White, concluded that
grievances expressed to the governor were entitled to the same degree of protection as judicial
proceedings, but held that the immunity granted to both was a qualified one. Chief Justice
Tilghman reasoned that assertions made with malice were actionable in either case:
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The Supreme Court in McDonald also cited the 1808 Massachusetts
decision in Commonwealth v. Clap49 as supposedly rejecting any absolute
immunity for petitions. Clap, however, did not involve any form of
petition5" and included no reference whatever to the right to petition in the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Clap contained only one passage of
possible relevance to McDonald; the Massachusetts court held that if
derogatory charges about a public official were made "maliciously, or with
intent to defame," the person making those charges in an attempt to secure
the removal of the officer could be prosecuted for criminal libel, even
though the allegations were truthful.5 1 That decision, which reflected a view
of libel law repudiated seventy years earlier by the jury in the Zenger case,52
certainly does not purport to stand for the very different view of the rights
to petition and to freedom of speech advocated in McDonald itself.
The Supreme Court's earlier decisions that some statements, such as
those uttered in judicial proceedings, are absolutely privileged created a
second and equally serious problem for the McDonald decision. One critical
premise of New York Times v. Sullivan53 was that in disputes between
government officials and members of the public, the degree of protection
the first amendment affords against libel suits should not put the private
participants at a disadvantage. "It would give public servants an unjustified
preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct did not
have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials
themselves. '54 The decision in McDonald largely destroys that equivalence.
Under many if not most circumstances, government officials enjoy
absolute immunity from libel actions in connection with statements related
to their official duties. In Barr v. Matteo53 the Court held that an executive
official, acting within the scope of his or her authority, is personally
I consider accusations preferred to the Governor, so far of the nature of judicial
proceedings, that the accuser is not held to prove the truth of them. Any thing which
satisfies the jury, that the proceeding did not originate in malice, and without
probable cause, is sufficient to excuse him. ... And the law is the same with regard
to counsel, who are highly privileged in pleading the cause of their client. If they
wantonly depart from the evidence and point in issue, with an intent to injure the
character of the adversary, without propriety or probable ground, they are respon-
sible. Nor are even witnesses entitled to any higher protection. They are to speak the
truth with freedom, but not to gratify malice under cover of law.
Gray, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 30.
49. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483 (citing Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169 (1808)).
50. William Clap had printed a libelous statement about Caleb Hayward, an auctioneer,
and posted it "in several public places." The statement read "Caleb Howard is a liar, a scoundrel,
a cheat, and a swindler. Don't pull this down." Clap, 4 Mass. at 163. Massachusetts prosecuted
Clap for criminal libel.
51, Clap, 4 Mass. at 169; see also id. at 168-69:
mhe defendant cannotjustify himself for publishing a libel, merely by proving the
truth of the publication.... If the law admitted the truth of the words in this case to
be a justification, the effect would be a greater injury to the party libelled.... [Tihe
evidence at the trial might more cruelly defame his character than the original libel.
52. See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OFJOHN PETER ZENGER (S. Katz 2d ed.
1970); L. RUTHERFORD, JoHN PETER ZENGER, His PRESs, His TRIAL, AND A BIBLICGRAPHY OF ZENGER
IwIRINs (1904).
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. Id. at 282-83 (quoted in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
55. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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immune from damage suits, even if the official's action injured a particular
individual. "[O]fficials of government should be free to exercise their duties
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits.... the threat of which might
appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of
policies of government."'56 In Briscoe v. Lahue57 the Court explained that
even the mere possibility of vexatious litigation might have an undesirable
chilling effect on the candor of witnesses at a judicial proceeding: "A
witness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit,
and perhaps pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor
of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the
finder of fact of candid, objective and undistorted evidence." 58 Similar
reasoning has prompted the Court to recognize that prosecutors59 and
legislators60 are absolutely immune from damage actions, including actions
based on allegedly libelous statements, made in the course of their official
duties. In Bradley v. Fisher,61 decided 27 years after White v. Nicholls, the
Court based absolute judicial immunity on the same consideration: "The
allegations of malicious or corrupt motives could always be made, and if the
motives could be inquired into, judges would be subjected to the same
vexatious litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives had or had
not any real existence. '62
The litigation in McDonald arose as a result of letters sent by McDonald
to then President-elect Reagan and several other high ranking federal
officials, opposing proposals that Smith be nominated to serve as the
United States Attorney for North Carolina.63 Most of McDonald's accusa-
tions were directed at Smith's conduct as a North Carolina Deputy District
Attorney and as a Superior Court Judge.64 Under Barr v. Matteo65 state-
ments made by Smith while he was in those positions were absolutely
privileged; Pierson v. Ray68 precluded McDonald or anyone else from suing
Smith in connection with his actions as a judge, and Imbler v. Pachtman67
barred actions against Smith because of any misconduct as a prosecutor.
McDonald's letter reiterated criticism of Smith that had been made by a
federal judge and magistrate.68 Although these federal officials enjoyed
absolute protection from libel actions based on those remarks, McDonald
56. Id. at 571.
57. 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
58. Id. at 333, 336 n.15.
59. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) (answering charges of wrongdoing
would divert prosecutors' energy from the "duty of enforcing the criminal law").
60. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (privilege "not for their private
indulgence but for the public good").
61. 80 U.S. 335 (1872).
62. Id. at 354.
63. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 480-81.
64. Joint Appendix at 8-13, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-476)
(alleging that Smith had been cited for his "obstreperous conduct" as Deputy District Attorney,
and that, while serving as temporary Superior Court Judge, Smith was directly involved with
the unlawful imprisonment of two individuals.).
65. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
66. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
67. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
68. Joint Appendix at 9, 12, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-476).
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was sued for reiterating their charges. The federal officials to whom
McDonald wrote similarly enjoyed absolute immunity, either because of
their positions in the executive branch or as members of Congress under
the speech and debate clause; they could with impunity either have
endorsed McDonald's charges, or have denounced McDonald as a liar. If
President Reagan and Senator Helms, having reviewed the same evidence
as had McDonald regarding Smith's past actions, publicly concluded that
Smith had been guilty of unethical and unlawful conduct on the bench or
as a prosecutor,69 their findings would have been fatal to Smith's chances of
selection as U.S. Attorney and severely harmful to his professional stature.
Yet only McDonald's identical conclusion, communicated in a private letter
to Reagan, Helms, and five other individuals, would have been actionable.
Smith's civil complaint, which was far more public than McDonald's original
allegations, asserted that McDonald had called Smith a "liar" and claimed in
turn that McDonald "knew that [his] statements were false and untrue."70
Essentially, Smith asserted that McDonald was in fact the liar; Smith's
counter charge, of course, was itself absolutely privileged because it was
part of ajudicial proceeding. Of all the participants in this controversy, only
McDonald lacked any "unqualified right to express damaging false-
hoods."71
The decision in McDonald, of course, did not actually award damages
against McDonald; it did, however, require McDonald to run the risks and
bear the expense of a lawsuit and, in all likelihood, a trial. The absolute
immunity accorded by other Supreme Court decisions to the executive,
legislative, and judicial participants in the controversy is based in part on a
recognition that such risks would impose an intolerable burden on the
ability of government officials to speak their minds.72
II. THE 1689 PETITION OF RIGHT AND THE TRIAL OF THE SEVEN BISHOPS
The Supreme Court noted in McDonald that the petition clause had its
roots in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 73 Having recognized the origin
of the clause, however, the Court chose not to inquire further into the
circumstances that had led to the framing of this seminal provision in the
69. Such a statement by Helms would apparently have been protected by the speech and
debate clause only if made on the floor of the Senate, at a Committee meeting, or otherwise
in the course of legislative activity. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 124-33 (1979).
70. Joint Appendix at 4, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-476).
71. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484.
72. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). In Doe the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that grants members of Congress immunity from liability for their speech within the
"legislative sphere." Id. at 312 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972)).
The Court further noted: 'Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have
been held absolutely immune regardless of their motive or good faith." Id. at 319; see
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("public criticism
by legislatures . . . whatever its form, is a legislative act shielded by the speech or debate
clause"). But see id. at 130 (majority opinion) (United States Senator may be liable for libelous
newsletters and press releases because these communications are not essential to deliberative
process).
73. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484.
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English Bill of Rights,74 or into the possible relevance of those circum-
stances to Smith's attempt to base his libel action on a petition for redress
of grievances. In this section, the Article undertakes what the Supreme
Court neglected to do, focusing in particular on the Seven Bishops Case,75
which was the immediate cause of the petition clause in the 1689 Bill of
Rights.76 That case makes clear that the English right to petition was
adopted, inter alia, to bar all libel actions founded on the contents of
petitions, even when the charges contained in those petitions were false and
malicious.
The origins of the 1689 guarantee are not the least obscure. The
English Bill of Rights contains an introduction expressly explaining that
Parliament was proclaiming the right to petition for redress of grievances,
as well as other rights, because the then recently deposed James II "did
endeavour to subvert and extirpate . . . the laws and liberties of this
kingdom... [b]y committing and prosecuting diverse worthy prelates for
humbly petitioning" the King.77 The criminal prosecution to which the Bill
of Rights referred was one of the most famous proceedings in English
constitutional history, the Seven Bishops Case.78 The 1688 trial of the seven
bishops was a subject of nearly universal knowledge and concern when the
Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689. The framers of the Bill of Rights had
intimate personal familiarity with the details of the trial; of the seven
lawyers who represented the bishops, five served the next year on the two
House of Commons committees that actually wrote the Bill of Rights, and
the chairmen of both committees had been among the bishops' attorneys. 79
In 1688 James II, the Catholic monarch of protestant England, issued
a Declaration of Indulgence suspending the operation of.various laws that
imposed disabilities on Catholics.80 Although his Declaration seems by
modern standards an act of enlightened toleration, it was perceived at the
time by most English gubjects as an assault on the power of Parliament, and
as the first step towards the imposition of Roman Catholicism as the state
religion. James II provoked particular consternation by requiring, in his
capacity as head of the Protestant Church of England, that all prelates read
the declaration from their pulpits. That directive was widely disobeyed, and
74. See infra text accompanying note 85.
75. 12 Howell St. Tr. 183 (1688).
76. An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown
(The Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688-89), reprinted in 9 Statutes at Large 67
(Pickering 1764).
77. Id.; 9 Statutes at Large 67, 69.
78. 12 Howell St. Tr. 183-524 (1688). More than a century later this trial remained such
a pivotal event in English history that it was the subject of noteworthy nineteenth-century
painting. The Acquittal of the Seven Bishops, 30th June 1688 (Edward M. Ward (1816-1879)).
79. The lawyers who represented the bishops and subsequently served on the Rights
Committees were Sir Heneage Finch, Henry Pollexfen, Sir Robert Sawyer, John Somers, and
Sir George Treby. Treby and Somers were the chairmen of the two committees involved. Sir
Cresswell Levinz was a member of the House of Lords that approved the Bill of Rights. Of the
defense attorneys, only Sir Francis Pemberton appears to have had no connection with the
drafting and approval of the Bill of Rights. L. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARaTION OF RIGTrs, 1689, at
246, 302-05, 319 n.38 (1981).
80. His Majesty's gracious Declaration to all his loving subjects for Liberty of Conscience (given at
Court of Whitehall April 1687 and May 1688), reprinted in 12 Howell St. Tr. 234-39 (1812).
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the Archbishop of Canterbury, together with six other bishops, submitted
to James a petition explaining their refusal to obey his order and asking to
be excused from any obligation to comply. The seven bishops were arrested
and prosecuted for seditious libel, the allegedly libelous statement being
the petition they had presented to the King. Their subsequent acquittal was
the cause of rejoicing throughout England, and a major step towards the
Glorious Revolution and the deposing of James I I in favor of William and
Mary.81
Although the details of the Seven Bishops Case are quite enlightening,
the central objection propounded by supporters of the bishops was not that
the defendants were innocent of the charges, but that those charges, even
if true, did not and ought not constitute a basis for taking legal action
against them. Several months after the acquittal of the bishops, William of
Orange, in a widely circulated explanation of his reasons for seeking to
replace James II as King of England, declared that James's
evil counsellors have endeavored to make all men to apprehend
the loss of their lives, liberties, honors and estates, if they should
go about to preserve themselves from... oppression by petitions,
representations, or other means authorized by law. Thus did they
proceed with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the other
bishops; who, having offered a most humble petition to the King,
in terms full of respect ... (in which they set forth, in short, the
reasons for which they could not obey that order ... requiring
them to appoint their clergy to read in their churches the
Declaration for Liberty of Conscience) were sent to prison, and
afterwards brought to a trial, as if they had been guilty of some
enormous crime. They were not only obliged to defend them-
selves in that pursuit, but... the judges that gave their opinions
in their favours were thereupon turned out. 2
81. See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 79, at 36 (trial of the Seven Bishops was "arguably the most
famous legal proceeding of the late seventeenth century, and certainly the most important
with respect to the Revolution of 1688-89"); see generally G. ALYMER, THE STUGCLE FOR -ME
CONSTITLTnON: ENGLXk.o IN THE SEVE\-E.E-rTH CEN-r'ity 213 (1938); C. HILL, THE CE'TURY OF
REVOULION 1603-1714, at 198-99, 237-39 (1961); J. KENTON, S7TUART ENGLAND 244-45 (1978); R.
LOCKVER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN: 1471-1714, at 361 (1964); J. MILLER, THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION 10 (1983); S. PLkLL, THE BLooDLEss REvo:.v-no.: ENGI.AND 1688, at 195-202 (1985); J.
T.A'NER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTrIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENr17H CE.NW'RY 1603-1689, at 256-61
(1952); G. TREVELAY..N, THE ENGLISH REvoLUrioN, 1688-89, at 87-94 (1938).
82. Declaration of Prince William Henry, Prince of Orange, of tize Reasons inducing him to appear
in armes in the Kingdom of England for preserving of thn Protestant Religion and for restoring the Laws
and Liberties of England, Scotland, and Ireland, quoted in 10 H.C.JOUR. 1688-93, at 1 (1803) (given
at the Court in the Hague, Oct. 10, 1688) and E. WILLIAMs, THE EiGH-mENr--CEN-ruRY
Co'isnn'-rio., 1688-1815, at 13 (1970). This declaration was the manifesto of the Glorious
Revolution. Its role in English history is probably comparable to that of the Declaration of
Independence in American history.
The Declaration was distributed from one end of England to the other. "Many
thousand copies" were sent across the Channel to be "consigned to some trusty
person in London" for distribution.... Friends of the prince were given as many as
3,000 copies and asked to distribute them in their counties and among their friends.
Bundles of free copies were sent to booksellers, who were invited to sell them at their




It was not sufficient that the bishops had been acquitted of the charges
against them; William of Orange objected that the very apprehension of
such charges, and the burden of defending against them, had had what we
would today describe as a chilling effect on those who wished to resort to
petitions to protect themselves from injustice. The proceedings at issue
were criminal rather than civil, but William regarded the financial threat to
the estates of the bishops as intolerable, and the defenders of the bishops
never suggested that a civil damage action against them would have been
any less offensive than criminal proceedings.
83
The charges filed against the seven bishops are undeniably the
paradigm of the type of accusation that the English petition clause was
framed to prevent. It is entirely arguable that the 1689 petition clause was
intended as an absolute bar to any legal proceeding based on the contents
of a petition.84 The terms of the clause certainly seem that sweeping: "[Tlhe
right of the subjects to petition the King, and all commitments and
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. '8 5 At the least the drafters of
the English petitioning clause intended to protect petitioners from the sort
of allegation made against the petitioners in the Seven Bishops Case, and
from the legal arguments offered in justification of that proceeding.
All of this is of critical importance to the issue in McDonald because the
seven bishops were charged, not with violating James II's order that they
read his Declaration or with having advocated disobedience by others, but
with seditious libel.8 6 The decision in McDonald, of course, does not assert
that all petitioners can be sued for libel; it holds, rather, that an action for
libel is consistent with the petition clause of the first amendment only if the
statements in the petition were false and the petitioner "acted with
malice. 8 7 But that was precisely the allegation made by the Crown against
the Archbishop of Canterbury and his six codefendants. The information
88
in the Seven Bishops Case alleged that the defendants
falsely, unlawfully, maliciously, seditiously, and, scandalously did
frame, compose and write, and caused to be framed, composed
L. SCHWOERER, supra note 79, at 115.
83. None of the defense lawyers disagreed when the Attorney General, during the trial of
the seven bishops, remarked regarding the crime of seditious libel: "[I]s there any thing on this
side [of] a capital crime that is a greater offence? is there any thing that does so tread upon the
heels of a capital offence, and comes so near the greatest of crimes that can be committed
against the government?" The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 225.
84. A general argument for virtually absolute protection for the contents of petitions is
made in Smith, supra note 1, at 1196-97.
85. An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown
(The Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688-89), reprinted in 9 Statutes at Large 67, 69
(Pickering 1764).
86. See The Seven Bishops Case for an exchange between Justice Powell and one of the
prosecutors:
Just[ice] Powell. The information is not for disobedience, brother, but for a libel.
Serj[eant] Baldock. No, Sir, it is not for disobedience, but it is for giving reasons for the
disobedience in a libellous petition ....
12 Howell St. Tr. at 418-19.
87. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
88. Informations were used to initiate criminal proceedings for offenses which affected the
King or endangered the government. C. WALKER, THE OXFORD CO.MpA.IOX TO LAw 616-17 (1980).
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and written, a certain false, feigned, malicious, pernicious and
seditious libel in writing, concerning our said lord the king, and
his royal Declaration and Order aforesaid, (under pretence of a
petition), and the same false, feigned, malicious, pernicious and
seditious Libel ... did publish and cause to be published .... 89
If, as McDonald holds, petitions containing malicious falsehoods "do not
enjoy constitutional protection," 90 the very charges levelled against the
seven bishops could today, despite the first amendment, support a civil or
criminal libel proceeding in federal court.9 1 Surely that cannot be correct,
for the English petition clause clearly was framed to halt all proceedings
based on the type of allegations made by the Crown in the Seven Bishops
Case, and there is no evidence that the framers of the petition clause in the
first amendment intended to give Americans a more restricted right to
petition than they had enjoyed as English subjects.
Defense counsel in the Seven Bishops Case articulated a specific coher-
ent theory as to why the information filed against their clients was deficient.
During the early stages of the trial the prosecution encountered some
difficulty proving that the signatures on the petitions were actually those of
the defendant bishops, 92 and that the bishops had "published" the libel by
disclosing it to a nonsignatory, the King.93 Eventually, however, the Crown
was able to produce witnesses to establish both critical facts.94 It is of
considerable significance that the prosecution and court never suggested
that any of the bishops had "published" the petition by revealing it to one
another, but tacitly assumed throughout that the Crown was required to
prove that the petition had been exhibited to someone for a purpose other
than to obtain his or her signature.9 5 The bulk of the trial, together with the
arguments of counsel and the comments and jury instructions of the fourjudges before whom the case was tried, was concerned primarily with two
issues: whether the document in question fell outside the realm of libel law
because it was a petition, and whether the petition was accurate when it
asserted that the authority claimed by James II to suspend the operation of
statutes, the so-called dispensing power, "hath been often declared illegal in
parliament."96
89. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 279 (emphasis added).
90. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
91. The Supreme Court appears to apply the same constitutional standards to civil and
criminal libel proceedings. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67 (reflecting distinctions between civil and
criminal libel statutes when the criticism is directed at public officials).
92. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 287-312.
93. Id. at 335-57.
94. Id, at 423-24 (The Lord Chief Justice summarizes the evidence on those points).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
96. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 239, 319. The Crown's arguments in favor
of the dispensing power are set out at 12 Howell St. Tr. 402 n.*, 405 n.*, 407 n.*, 407, 410-12.
The bishops' arguments to the contrary are at 12 Howell St. Tr. 396-97. The full text of the
allegedly libellous petition was as follows:
To the King's most excellent Majesty.
The humble petition of William Archbishop of Canterbury, and of divers of the
suffragan Bishops of that province, now present with him, in behalf of themselves
and others of their absent brethren, and of the clergy of their respective dioceses,
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The bishops raised the right to petition defense early in the trial in
response to the wording of the information. The information alleged that
the bishops had libeled the King "praetensu petitionsis, ' '97 which the clerk
translated to the jury as "under pretence of a petition."98 The information
quoted the body of the petition, which set forth the bishops' criticism of the
dispensing power, but omitted both the heading, which indicated the
document had been addressed to the King, and the conclusion, which
contained a prayer for relief.99 When the clerk began to read to the jury
only the portion of the petition contained in the information, counsel for
the bishops successfully demanded that the omitted portions be read as
well. 100 Defense attorneys then argued that the evidence disproved the
allegations of the information, because the bishops had been charged with
"a pretended petition," but the proof demonstrated that the full document
was in fact a genuine petition, and not simply a gratuitous attack on the
dispensing power.
If ... there be an information ... that.., charges a man with a
pretended petition, and the evidence comes and proves a petition
both top and bottom, that is not the petition in the information:
for that lacking the proper parts of a petition, is called a
pretended petition, but that which is proved, is proved a real
one.101
The attorneys representing the bishops denounced the Crown's apparent
Humbly sheweth; that the great averseness they find in themselves to the
distributing and publishing in all their churches your majesty's late Declaration for
Liberty of Conscience, proceedeth neither from any want of duty and obedience to
your majesty (our holy mother, the Church of England, being both in her principles
and in her constant practice unquestionably loyal; and having, to her great honour,
been more than once publicly acknowledged to be so by your gracious majesty), nor
yet from any want of due tenderness to dissenters, in relation to whom they are
willing to come to such a temper as shall be thought fit, when the matter shall be
considered and settled in parliament and convocation; but amongst many other
considerations, from this especially, because that Declaration is founded upon such a
dispensing power as hath been often declared illegal in parliament, and particularly
in the years 1662, and 1672, and in the beginning of your majesty's reign; and is a
matter of so great moment and consequence to the whole nation, both in church and
state, that your petitioners cannot in prudence, honour or conscience, so far make
themselves parties to it, as the distribution of it all over the nation, and the solemn
publication of it once and again, even in God's house, and in the time of his divine
service, must amount to, in common and reasonable construction.
Your petitioners therefore most humbly and earnestly beseech your majesty, that
you will be graciously pleased not to insist upon their distributing and reading your
majesty's said Declaration.
The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 318-19.
97. Id. at 238.
98. Id. at 279.
99. The Latin version of the information, which contains the quoted portion of the
petition, is at 12 Howell St. Tr. 238. The English version of the information, at 12 Howell St.
Tr. 279, does not quote the petition in full, but merely quotes the first and last words of the
petition.
100. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 318 ("Read the whole petition; I pray, my
lord, that the whole may be read. Read the top first, Sir, to whom it was directed.").
101. Id. at 321; see also infra text accompanying notes 167-69 (well-financed petition could
not be basis for libel action).
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attempt to provide the jury with a version of the bishops' statement so
edited that it did not appear to be a petition at all.102 The omission, the
bishops urged, was not merely a matter of distortion; it fundamentally
changed the nature of the legal issues involved.
[T]ake the whole petition together, and . .. it is a reasonable
petition; chop off the direction and the prayer, and then here's
nothing but the body of a petition, without beginning or ending;
... if a man will say any thing concerning the king, and do it by
way of petition . . . that will alter the case mightily from a paper
spread about, that should contain only the body of the petition,
and nothing else. 103
Writing in 1985, the McDonald Court would dismiss the right to
petition as having no independent significance, being but a particular
application of the right of free speech. 1'0 1 No one in 1688, however, held
such a view. In the late seventeenth century, although the existence of a
right to petition was widely accepted and understood, there was no
comparable recognition of any general right of freedom of speech. The
1689 Bill of Rights, the codification of then prevailing libertarian thought,
contained no reference to freedom of speech, and in that year the infamous
Licensing Act, which required prior government approval for the printing
of any book, was still in effect, having been renewed by Parliament as
recently as 1685.105 Counsel for the seven bishops thus advanced no
argument that their clients had any general right to speak about govern-
ment affairs. The claim they did assert, one which made the omitted
portions of the bishops' statement "alter the case mightily,"1 06 was that it
was "the right of all people that apprehend themselves aggrieved, to
approach his majesty by petition."10 7 "[H]ow sad the condition of us all
would be, if we may not petition when we suffer."'08 The bishops insisted
not only that it would be unfortunate if they could be subjected to legal
proceedings for submitting a petition, but also that the making of such a
petition "sure was lawful for all the bishops as subjects to do."'1 9 "[T]his
petition is no more than what any man ... might humbly do... and not
102. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 320 ("this information and petition do not
agree; for they have brought an information, and set forth, that my lords the bishops, under
pretence of a petition, did make a libel, and they have set forth no petition at all; all the
petitionary part is omitted"); id. ("this information hath made a very deformed thing of it, has
left neither head nor tail... it is without any direction to any body, and without any prayer
for any thing; and without those two it cannot be told what it is"); id. at 323 ("It is quite another
thing; that which is produced, from that which is in the information, by this leaving out a part;
for here is the prayer omitted, and the direction."); id. at 358 ("They indeed do not deal fairly
with the court nor with us, in that they do not set it forth that it was a petition.").
103. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
104. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 ("The Petition Clause... was inspired by the same ideals
of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble."); id. at
489-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (first amendment rights are interrelated).
105. F. SIEEPRT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, at 241-44 (1965).
106. Id. at 321.
107. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 369-70.
108. Id. at 395.
109. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
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be guilty of a crime."11 0 The right of the bishops to offer the petition was
particularly compelling because the bishops sought to explain why they
wished to be excused from obeying a directive of the King.
I think it can be no question, but that any subject that is
commanded by the king to do a thing which he conceives to be
against law, and against his conscience, may humbly apply himself
to the king, and tell him the reason why he does not that thing he
is commanded to do, why he cannot concur with his majesty in
such a command."'
It was harsh and unjust that the Crown, simply by including in the
information an allegation that the petition had been written with "malice,"
should force the bishops to face a criminal proceeding." 2
Counsel for the bishops offered two reasons for protecting petitioners
from libel actions that could be properly maintained under other circum-
stances. First, they insisted that a petition was special because it was a device
by which the petitioner not only commented on government affairs, but
also prayed for action to redress a grievance. An appeal to the King, they
contended, was often the only means by which an aggrieved citizen could
secure relief. Second, defense counsel maintained that petitions often
facilitated enlightened governmental decisionmaking because they fre-
quently contained information or advice that might persuade the Crown to
abandon an imprudent course of action.
The need to protect a mechanism for the redress of grievances was, as
we shall see, the traditional basis on which court decisions then accorded to
petitions the same absolute protection given to statements in judicial
proceedings:' s3
[T]here is... disingenuity... in only reciting the body, and not
the prayer.
But... taking the petitionary part, and adding it to the other,
it quite alters the nature of the thing; for it may be, a complaint
without seeking redress might be an ill matter; but here taking the
whole together, it appears to be a complaint of a grievance, and a
desire to be eased of it.
[T]he subjects have a right to petition the king in all their
grievances, so say all our books of law ... ; they all times have had
a right so to do, and indeed if they had not, it were the most
110. Id. at 360.
111. Id. at 359; see also id. at 393 ("the bishops lying under this pressure ... they by petition
apply to the king to be eased of it, which they might do as subjects").
112. Sir R. Sawyer, arguing on behalf of the bishops, stated:
[M]y lords the bishops being grieved in this manner, made this petition to the king in
the most private and respectful manner; and for [the Attorney General] to load it
with such horrid black epithets, that it was done libelously, maliciously, and
scandalously, and to oppose the king and government, 'tis very hard; 'tis a case of a
very extraordinary nature, and I believe my lords the bishops cannot but conceive a
great deal of trouble, that they should lie under so heavy a charge ....
12 Howell St. Tr. at 359-60. "mo make this to be a libel, by putting in the words malicious,
seditious, scandalous, and with an intent to raise sedition, would be pretty hard." Id. at 371.
113. See Part III infra.
74 IOWA LAW REVIEW
lamentable thing in the world, that men must have grievances
upon them, and yet they not to be admitted to seek relief in a
humble way."14
The bishops' petition was analogized to a similar request made to a judge:
[Siuppose a justice of peace were making of a warrant -to a
constable, to do something that was not legal for him to do, if the
constable should petition this justice of the peace, and therein set
forth, Sir, you are about to command me to do a thing which, I
conceive, is not legal; surely that would not be a crime that he was
to be punished for: for he does but seek relief, and shew his
grievance in a proper way, and the distress he is under.
My lord, this is the bishops' case .... they with all humility, by
way of petition, acquaint the king with this distress of theirs, and
pray him, that he will please to give relief.115
For the proposition that otherwise libelous words in a petition, like
similar words in any regular judicial proceeding, could not provide a basis
for a legal action against the petition, counsel for the bishops cited Lake v.
King, the very precedent dismissed by the Supreme Court in McDonald. An
attorney for the bishops argued,
[I]t concerns them that have no other remedy, to address the king,
by petition, about it.
For.. . if a proper remedy be pursued in a proper court, for a
grievance complained of, though there may be many hard words
that else would be scandalous, yet being in a regular course, they
are no scandal: and it is said [in] Lake's case, in my lord Hobart."16
My lord, we must appeal to the king, or we can appeal to
nobody, to be relieved against an order ... with which we are
aggrieved .... 117
Lake v. King was the only judicial decision specifically cited by counsel for
the bishops to establish that their clients' conduct was entitled to legal
protection. In 1845 the Supreme Court would criticize Lake as insufficiently
"modern," and in 1985 Chief Justice Burger would dismiss Lake as
"anomalous," but in 1688 Lake, then only twenty years old, seemed entirely
up-to-date and sound law to the men who defended the seven bishops and
who shortly thereafter wrote the petition clause of the English Bill of
Rights.
Counsel for the bishops also argued that special protection for
petitions was important because the government had need of the informa-
tion which petitions might contain. The bishops relied in part on a
sixteenth-century statute imposing on clerics throughout England an
obligation to assure "the due and true execution"'"18 of the laws establishing
114, The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 393-94.
115. Id. at 394.
116. The speaker evidently mistakenly assumed that Laki v. King was also reported by
Hobart. The case reported by Hobart, however, is Lake v. Hatton, decided halfa century before
Lake v. King. Hatton, Hob. 252, 80 Eng. Rep. 398 (S.C. circa 1618).
117. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 364.
118. Id. at 364 (citing An Act for the uniformity of common prayer and service in the church, and
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the Church of England as the official church. The Seven Bishops Case arose
from James II's attempt to supersede some of those very laws. Defense
counsel repeatedly urged on behalf of the bishops that in advising the King
that his order was unlawful, "we have done nothing but our duty."119 But
the argument was also cast in broader terms:
[S]uppose, my lord (which is not to be supposed in every case,
nor do I suppose it in this.) But suppose that there might be a king
of England that should be misled. I do not suppose that to be the
case now, I say, but I know it hath been the case formerly, that the
king should be environed with counsellors that had given him evil
advice; it hath been objected as a crime against such evil counsel-
lors, that they would not permit and suffer the great men of the
kingdom to offer the king their advice. How often do we say in
Westminster-hall, that the king is deceived in his grant: there is
scarce a day in the term, but it is said in one court or other; but it
was never yet thought an offence to say so: and what more is there
in this case?
My lord, if the king was misinformed, or under a misapprehen-
sion of the law, my lords, as they are peers, and as they are
bishops, are concerned in it; and if they humbly apply themselves
to the king, and offer him their advice, where is the crime?120
This second rationale for the protection of petitions was significant because
it did not rest on, or require the presence of, a prayer for relief; so long as
a "petition" provided the King with advice or information that might lead
to the correction of "mistaken"'21 government action, the document served
an important purpose.
Counsel for the bishops did not contend that all forms of petitioning
were beyond legal control or sanction, but they insisted that any constraints
could be directed only at the method of petitioning, not at the content of
the petition itself. This distinction, they urged, was grounded in a 1661
statute, 122 adopted at the end of the Interregnum,1 23 regulating the
manner in which petitions were to be organized and presented. That law
asserted that "the late unhappy wars, confusions and calamities in this
nation" had been caused in part by the "tumultuous and other disorderly
soliciting and procuring of hands by private persons to petitions."'124 To
administration of the sacraments, 1 Eliz. 1 ch. 2, § 15 (1558), reprinted in 6 Statutes at Large 117,
120 (Pickering 1763)).
119. Id. at 365; see also id. at 368, 371, 395-96 (referring to the King's inability to dispense
with laws without an act of Parliament).
120. Id. at 368-69.
121. Id. at 371 ("For I never thought it, nor hath it ever, sure, been thought by any body
else, to be a crime to petition the King: for the King may be mistaken ....").
122. An Act against tumults and disorders, upon pretence of preparing or presenting publick petitions,
or other addresses to his Majesty or the parliament, 13 Car. 2, ch. 5 (1661), reprinted in 8 Statutes at
Large 6 (Pickering 1763). This statute was also cited by the Kentish petitioners in 1701 as the
source of their right to present to Parliament a petition which the House deemed scandalous,
insolent, and seditious. D. DEFOE, THE HISTORy OF THE KENTISH PETTON (1701), reprinted in 8 AN
ENGLISH GARNER: LATER STUART TRAcTs 165-66 (G. Aitken ed. 1903).
123. The Interregnum lasted from the execution of Charles I in 1649 to the restoration of
Charles II in 1660. See D. WALKER, THE OXFORD CO.PANION TO LAw 645 (1980).
124. 13 Car. 2, ch. 5, § 1 (1661), reprinted in 8 Statues at Large 6 (Picketing 1763).
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prevent the recurrence of such troubles, the statute made it a crime to solicit
the signatures of more than twenty people on a petition, absent prior
approval by the local justices or grand jury, or to be accompanied by more
than ten people when presenting a petition.' 25 The law also contained,
however, the following reservation:
Provided always, that this act, or any thing therein contained,
shall not be construed to extend to debar or hinder any person or
persons, not exceeding the number of ten aforesaid, to present
any publick or private grievance or complaint to any member or
members of parliament after his election, and during the contin-
uance of the parliament, or to the king's majesty, for any remedy
to be thereupon had .... 126
The Bishops insisted this statute amounted to a reaffirmation of the right
to petition. 127 "[A] libel it could not be, because ... they kept within the
bounds set by the act of parliament, that gives the subject leave to apply to
his prince by petition, when he is aggrieved."' 28 So long as a person acted
in conformity with the procedural requirements of the 1661 statute, the
bishops' counsel urged, a petitioner was protected from any action based on
the contents of his petition.
The contentions offered by the Crown in an attempt to rebut these
defense arguments are as important to the meaning of the English petition
clause as the bishops' own arguments. The Crown's position epitomized the
view of the law which the defenders of the bishops and the framers of that
clause intended to reject. First, the prosecution argued that petitions were
not entitled to any treatment different than that accorded to other written
materials, such as books. Second, the Crown insisted that, although the
prayer for relief in a petition might be protected, the reasons supporting
the prayer were not. Third, the prosecution maintained that only those
petitions presented to Parliament could be immune from libel actions, not
those directed to the King.
The prosecution's first contention corresponded precisely to the
position adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Smith that the
contents of a petition enjoy no greater legal protection than the substance
of any other document. Early in the trial of the Seven Bishops, in response
to defense objections that the information omitted critical portions of the
actual petition, the Attorney General insisted that "speaking of ill things in
the body of a petition" could not be rendered lawful by
giving it the good tite of a petition, and concluding it with a good
prayer. 'Tis not, I say, any of these that will sweeten this crime, or
will alter or alleviate it; if there be that which is seditious and
libelous in the body of the writing, call the paper what you will,
and smoothing it with a specious preamble, or conclusion, that
125. 13 Car. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1661), reprinted in 8 Statutes at Large 6 (Pickering 1763).
126. 13 Car. 2, ch. 5, § 3 (1661), reprinted in 8 Statutes at Large 7 (Pickering 1763).
127. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 392-93 ("[IThe subjects have a right to
petition in all their grievances, so says the statute of the thirteenth of the late King; they may
petition, and come and deliver their petition under the number of ten, as heretofore they
might have done, says the statute .....
128. Id. at 397.
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will [not] make it any thing less a libel. 129
The Attorney General returned to this argument later in the trial, asserting
that "no man will say, that a good preface at the beginning, or a good
prayer at the end, should excuse treason or sedition in the body of a
book."'30 When, in his closing argument for the Grown, the Recorder
reiterated this suggestion that a petition was no different than a book, he
drew a sharp rebuke from Justices Holloway and Powell:
Recorder.... [F]or the form of this paper, as being a petition,
there is no more excuse in that neither: for every man has as much
right to publish a book, or pamphlet, as they had to present their
petition. And as it would be punishable in that man to write a
scandalous book, so it would be punishable in them to make a
scandalous, and a libellous petition. And the author of Julian the
Apostate, because he was a clergyman, and a learned man too,
had as much right to publish his book, as my lords the bishops had
to deliver this libel to the king....
Just[ice] Holloway. Pray, good Mr. Recorder, don't compare the
writing of a book to the making of a petition; for it is the birthright
of the subject to petition.
Just[ice] Powell. Mr. Recorder, you will as soon bring the two
poles together, as make this petition to agree with Johnson's
book.[ 31] They are no more alike than the most different things
you can name. 3 2
The prosecutors argued in the alternative that while the King's
subjects might have a right to petition for redress of grievances, the
guarantee protected only the request for a particular form of relief, and did
not extend to libelous assertions that might be made as part of the
argument in support of that request. In the context of McDonald v. Smith,
this argument suggests that while McDonald would have had an absolute
right to urge the President not to nominate Smith as U.S. Attorney,
McDonald acted at his peril when he went further and gave reasons for his
opposition to Smith. The prosecutors insisted that the bishops might with
impunity have prayed for leave to be excused from obeying the King's
129. Id. at 322.
130. Id. at 402.
131. The author of Julian the Apostate, printed in 1682, was Samuel Johnson. See 10 THE
DICTIONARY OF NATioNAL BIOGRAPHY 916 (L. Stephen & S. Lee eds. 1921-22). InJulian the Apostate,
Johnson argued against unconditional obedience and equated "popery" with "modern
paganism." After a critical response by George Hickes in 1683, Johnson countered with Julian's
Arts and Methods to undermine and extirpate Christianity. The Privy Council examined the book's
contents, though the book remained unpublished until 1689, and opted to imprison Johnson.
Later in 1683, Johnson was convicted of a seditious libel, a conviction based on the contents
of Julian the Apostate. Johnson's 1686 work, A Humble and Hearty Address to All the English
Protestants in the Present Army, allowed Johnson to do "more towards paving the way for King
William's revolution than any other man in England." Id. at 917. He was again prosecuted for
the contents of his work. Id. at 917-18.
132. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 419-20. The Recorder was Sir Bartholomew
Shower. Id. at 419.
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order, but argued that the bishops enjoyed no such protection when they
went further and, in an attempt to justify that prayer, criticized the actions
of the King himself:
[R]easons might have been given, and good reasons should be
given, why they should not do this in duty to his majesty; more
gentle reasons, and other kind of reasons than those that they
have given ....
... [The information] is not for disobedience, but it is for giving
reasons for the disobedience in a libelious petition . . .. The
declaration is said in the petition to be illegal; which is a charge
upon the king, that he has done an illegal act. They say, they
cannot in honour, conscience, or prudence, do it; which is a
reflection upon the prudence, justice, and honour of the king in
commanding them to do such a thing. 33
The Attorney General, making the same argument, insisted that libelous
arguments in a petition to the King were punishable because libelous
assertions in a petition to a judge would be equally criminal.'3 4 Justice
Powell immediately recognized that acceptance of that argument would
largely eviscerate the right to petition, because petitioners might on this
theory be precluded from stating the basis on which their claim for relief
was founded. Justice Powell observed, "if they had petitioned, and not have
shewn the reason why they could not obey, it would have been looked upon
as a piece of sullenness, and that they would have been blamed for as
much ..... ,13 5
Finally, the prosecution argued that although the subjects might have
a right to petition, that right extended only to petitions submitted to
Parliament while in session, not to petitions proffered directly to the King.
The Solicitor General contended:
I do agree, that in parliament the lords and commons may make
133. Id. at 418-19; see also id. at 416-17:
"[I]t is one thing for a man to submit to his prince, if the king lay a command upon
him that he cannot obey, and another thing to affront him. If the king will impose
upon a man what he cannot do... shall he come and fly in the face of his prince?
Shall he say it is illegal? and the prince acts against prudence, honour or conscience,
and throw dirt in the king's face?"
In this passage the word "submit" appears to refer to submitting a request to be excused from
compliance.
134. Id. at 399-400:
A man may petition a judge; but if any man in that petition shall come and tell thejudge, sir, you have given an illegal judgment against me, and I cannot in honour,
prudence, or conscience obey it; I do not doubt, nor will any man, but that he that
should so say, would be laid by the heels, though the judgment perhaps might be
illegal.
If a man shall come to petition the king, as we all know, the council doors are
thronged with petitioners every day, and access to the king by petition is open to
every body, the most inferior person is allowed to petiticn the king; but because he
may do so, may he therefore suggest what he pleases in his petition? Shall he come
and tell the king to his face what he does is illegal?
135. Id. at 417.
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addresses to the king, and signify their desires, and make known
their grievances there; and there is no doubt but that is a natural
and proper way of application: for in the beginning of the
parliament, there are receivers of petitions appointed, and upon
debates, there are committees appointed to draw up petitions and
addresses; but to come and deduce an argument, that because the
lords in parliament have done thus . . .therefore my lords the
bishops may do it out of parliament, that is certainly a non sequitur
The lords may address to the king in parliament, and the
commons may do it ....
[ .. T]hat is the regular legal way. . . . [T]hese being the
methods that these lords should have taken, they should have
pursued that method; the law should have carved out their relief
and remedy for them, but they were for going by a new fancy of
their own.136
Petitions to Parliament, or addresses in Parliament itself, were "the regular
legal way... to address and apply to the king" and "to redress grievances"
because Parliament had the power to correct any injustice by impeaching
the offending official.' 37 Implicit in this argument was a concession that the
bishops could not have been prosecuted had the same petition been
submitted to Parliament when it met later in the year, rather than to the
King. In response to this contention, Justice Powell and the Lord Chief
Justice stated that they believed the subjects had the same right to petition
the King directly that, as the Crown conceded, they had to petition the
Parliament. s38
Each of the four justices who heard the case offered the jury his own
quite distinct view of the law and evidence. Their opinions must be
evaluated in the context of their prior and subsequent careers. Both Justice
Allybone and the Lord Chief Justice, Robert Wright, were regarded as
unduly inclined to do the bidding of the Crown; both had been appointed
to the King's Bench in 1687 after James II removed their predecessors for
refusing to order the immediate execution of a defendant then under
sentence of death.139 Justice Holloway, appointed by Charles II in 1683,
together with Justice Powell, who had been named to the bench by James
136. Id. at 404-09; see also supra note 96 (citation to Crown's arguments in favor of
dispensing power).
137. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 403 n.*.
138. Id. at 407:
[Here Mr. Justice Powell spake aside to the Lord Chief Justice thus]
Mr. Just[ice] Powell. My Lord, this is a strange doctrine! Shall not the subject have
liberty to petition the king but in parliament? If that be law, the subject is in a
miserable case.
L.C.J. Brother, let him go on, we will hear him out, though I approve not of his
position.
139. Id. at 261-63 n.t.
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II, were both removed byJames II shortly after the completion of the Seven
Bishops Case because the King was displeased with the manner in which they
had acted during the trial. 140
The Lord Chief Justice's comments were the most favorable to the
Crown. In his instructions to the jury, the Lord Chief Justice made no
mention whatever of the defense argument that the bishops might be
entitled to judgment, or at least had a stronger case, because the alleged
libel was contained in a petition.' 4 ' He instructed the jury that the petition
in question was indeed libelous: "[A]ny thing that shall disturb the
government, or make mischief and a stir among the people, is certainly
within the case of 'Libellis Famosis;'[ t42] and I must in short give you my
opinion, I do take it to be a libel[,] .. . this being a point of law.' 4 3 Earlier
during the closing argument, the Lord Chief Justice had indicated that
while the bishops were entitled to petition the King, that right did not
immunize otherwise libelous statements contained in the petition:
I am of opinion that the bishops might petition the king; but this
is not the right way of bringing it in. I am not of that mind that
they cannot petition the king out of parliament; but if they may
petition, yet they ought to have done it after another manner: for
if they may in this reflective[ 144] way petition the king, [ am sure
it will make the government very precarious. 145
For the Lord Chief Justice it was of little or no relevance that the libel at
issue was part of a petition.
Justice Allybone, although also instructing the jury that the bishops'
statement was libelous, took a more complex and interesting position.
Allybone railed against the notion that ordinary subjects had any right of
free speech regarding government affairs:
[N]o man can take upon him to write against the actual exercise of
the government, unless he have leave from the government, but
he makes a libel, be what he writes true or false; for if once we
come to impeach the government by way of argument, it is the
argument that makes it the government or not the government.
... [T]he government ought not to be impeached by argument,
nor the exercise of the government shaken by argument ....
... It is the business of the government to manage matters
relating to the government; it is the business of subjects to mind
only their own properties and interests. If my interest is not
shaken, what have I to do with matters of government?1 46
If any man had the effrontery to criticize the government in a matter not
directly affecting his own interests, that criticism was criminal libel, and that
libel was more, not less, egregious if contained in a petition:
140. Id. at 263 n.t.
1411. Id. at 421-26.
142. The Case de Libellis Famosis, or of Scandalous Libels, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep.
250 (1605).
1,13. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 426.
144. In this context "reflective" appears to mean reflecting adversely on the King.
145. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 417.
146. Id. at 427-28.
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[L]et us consider further, whether, if I will take upon me to
contradict the government, any specious pretence that I shall put
upon it shall dress it up in another form, and give it a better
denomination? And truly I think it is the worse, because it comes
in a better dress; . . . so that whether it be in the form of a
supplication, or an address, or a petition, if it be what it ought not
to be, let us call it by its true name, and give it its right
denomination-it is a libel. 147
Allybone insisted, however, that the situation would have been different if
the bishops had had a financial or other personal interest at stake:
If the government does come to shake my particular interest, the
law is open for me, and I may redress myself by law ....
I do agree, that every man may petition the government, or the
king, in a matter that relates to his own private interest, but...
... I think these venerable bishops did meddle with that which
did not belong to them: they took upon them, in a petitionary, to
contradict the actual exercise of the government, which I think no
particular persons, or singular body, may do. 148
Although it is unclear what additional rights subjects would have to petition
when their own personal interests were at issue, Justice Allybone's comment
seems to imply that the libel laws would not apply to such petitions.
Justice Holloway insisted that the bishops should be acquitted if the
alleged libel was contained in a bona fide petition:
The question is, whether this petition of my lords the bishops be
a libel or no[t]. Gentlemen, the end and intention of every action
is to be considered; and likewise, in this case, we are to consider
the nature of the offence that these noble persons are charged
with; it is for delivering a petition, which, according as they have
made their defence, was with all the humility and decency that
could be: so that if there was no ill intent.., to deliver a petition
cannot be a fault, it being the right of every subject to petition. If
you are satisfied there was an ill intention of sedition, or the like,
you ought to find them guilty: but if there be nothing in the case
that you find, but only that they did deliver a petition to save
themselves harmless, and to free themselves from blame, by
shewing the reason of their disobedience to the king's command,
which they apprehended to be a grievance to them, and which
they could not in conscience give obedience to, I cannot think it is
a libel .... 149
The intent of the defendants mattered to Holloway, but only in a very
narrow sense. For Holloway, petitions were absolutely protected if the
petitioners were actually aggrieved by the matter about which they com-
147. Id. at 428.
148. Id. at 428-29.
149. Id. at 426.
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plained and if they filed the petition for the purpose of redressing that
grievance. So long as that was the intent of the petition, the document was
a genuine petition, and "the right of every subject to petition" precluded
the petition, as "a point of law," from being held a libel.
During the closing argument, Justice Powell insisted that the right to
petition ought to include a right to set forth whatever arguments the
petitioner thought supported his prayer. 50 In his comments to the jury,
however, Powell made no mention of the significance of the petition issue.
Rather he directed his statements to the prosecution's evidence, which he
found insufficient to demonstrate that the contents of the petition were in
fact false, malicious, or tended to sedition. 51
Eighteenth-century histories of the events leading to the Glorious
Revolution, although less detailed than the account in Howel's State Trials,
emphasized a number of the key aspects of the Seven Bishops Case. David
Hume's 1778 History of England, for example, reiterated the contention that
any petition signed and presented in compliance with the statute of 1661
was protected by law:
The council for the bishops pleaded, that the law allowed
subjects, if they thought themselves aggrieved in any particular, to
address themselves by petition to the king, provided they kept
within certain bounds, which the same law prescribed to them,
and which in the present petition the prelates had strictly ob-
served .... 152
Hume also asserted, with evident approbation, that the bishops had framed
their petition "[i]n order to encourage" other clergymen "in their resolution
... to preserve the regard of the people" by refusing to read James II's
Declaration. 153 If, as Hume evidently assumed, a petition submitted for
such a purpose was within the legal rights of the bishops, it necessarily
followed that a petition enjoyed legal protection regardless of whether or
not its sole purpose was to obtain redress for the petitioner.154
Whatever else the framers of the English petition clause might have
had in mind, they certainly intended the clause to bar completely any future
prosecutions similar to the Seven Bishops Case, and not merely to throw light
on the legal issues that might arise in such criminal proceedings. The
framers manifested their intent in the wording of the clause, which declares
illegal not only punishment but also "all commitments ... for petitioning."'55
Neither the standard proposed by Justice Powell, nor that of Justice
Holloway, would have sufficed to assure that no subject could ever again be
arrested for having petitioned the King. Powell was prepared to concede
that a petition would constitute criminal libel if its contents were false,
seditious, and written with malice; Holloway insisted on absolute protection
for bona fide petitions, but evidently would have permitted the criminal
150. See supra text accompanying note 135.
151. The Seven Bishops Case, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 426-27.
152. 8 D. HUME, THE HIs-ToRY oF E, GLAND 264-65 (1780).
153. Id. at 262.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 121-28.




prosecution of a petitioner so long as the information alleged that the actual
purpose of the petitioner was to encourage sedition rather than to obtain
the redress prayed for in the petition. The only legal theory that would
have produced the protection contemplated by the 1689 Bill of Rights was
that set forth in Lake v. King and elaborated by counsel for the seven
bishops-that no adverse legal action could be founded on a petition, that
any document directed to the government and seeking to redress griev-
ances was legally a petition, and that anyone submitting such a petition was
entitled to that immunity, regardless of the reasons given in the body of the
petition to justify the requested relief.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Both the Court and the parties in McDonald evidently assumed that
Lake v. King was an isolated event in Englishjudicial history, without either
forbearers or progeny. Had that been the case, and had Lake itself remained
obscure during the eighteenth century, a plausible argument might have
been advanced that there was insufficient evidence on which to base any
definitive conclusion regarding the state of the law in 1791. As this section
demonstrates, however, the rule applied in Lake-that libel actions could
not be based on the contents of a petition-had been the law for almost a
century before Lake was decided and remained unquestioned in the century
which followed. By treating similarly pleas for judicial relief and petitions
for redress of grievances, English courts afforded even false and malicious
petitions absolute immunity, reasoning that any lesser degree of protection
would deter subjects from bringing their complaints to the government.
The earliest reported case regarding libel actions based on a petition
for redress of grievances is the 1585 decision in Hare v. Mellers:156
Action on the case does not lie for any slanderous words contained
in any bill or petition to the queen unless it is published before it
is delivered. Quaere if the matter in this bill is not examinable in
that court; then it seems that an action lies.157
A "bill... to the queen" evidently referred to a civil complaint in the royal
courts. The decision suggests that an action might lie for a libelous bill if
that bill had been submitted to a royal court, which lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim. Indeed, the existence of such a limitation on the
immunity accorded to statements in connection with judicial proceedings
was well established by the mid-sixteenth century. The absolute privilege
for petitions to the Queen, however, was subject to no such restriction,
presumably because the Queen had authority to act on any petition. The
particular libel claim in Hare was based on an allegedly libelous statement
made in a bill, rather than in a petition. The court based its dismissal of the
libel claim not on a distinct immunity rule for civil actions, but on the fact
that a bill exhibited in court, apparently Queen's Bench, was nominally a
request for justice addressed to the Queen herself:
156. This case is referred to by slightly different names. Hare & Mellers Case, 3 Leon. 138,
74 Eng. Rep. 591 (C.P. 1586); Hare & Meller's Case, 3 Leon. 163, 74 Eng. Rep. 607 (C.P.
1587); and Hare v. Millows, R. HELMIHOL1Z, SELEcr CAsEs oN DEFAMA-ION TO 1600, at 84 (1985).
157. R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 156, at 84.
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Hugh Hare .. . brought an action upon the case against Philip
Meller, and declared, that the said defendant had exhibited to the
Queen a scandalous bill against the plaintiff charging the said
Hugh to have recovered against the said defendant 400 [pounds]
by forgery, perjury, and foreswearing and cozenage;[158] and also
that he published the matter of the said bill at Westm[inster] [etc.]
It was said by the Court, that the exhibiting of the bill to the
Queen, is not in it self any cause of action; for the Queen is the
head and fountain of justice, and therefore it is lawful for all her
subjects to resort to her to make their complaints.' 59
If English subjects had an absolute right to seek relief from the Queen
as the "head and fountain of justice," absolute immunity for statements in
civil complaints and in petitions would be but two applications of the same
principle. In the United States today, the procedures in civil suits differ
greatly from the internal workings of Congress and the executive branch,
and appeals for judicial relief are no longer, in either form or substance,
prayers for redress from the chief executive. To twentieth-century Su-
preme Court Justices, as to ordinary Americans, a letter to the President
seems totally unlike a formal complaint framed under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. At first blush, it might appear surprising that letters and
complaints were treated alike for purposes of a libel action, because today,
as was true 400 years ago, private letters and civil pleadings are governed
by completely different standards in virtually all other contexts. But in the
sixteenth century, a civil suit and a petition to the Crown were regarded as
simply two different methods of obtaining justice from the government,
which in the broadest sense is true even to this day.160
Although Hare recognized an absolute privilege in connection with
judicial proceedings, subsequent decisions applying that privilege generally
cited either or both of two other late sixteenth-century decisions, Cutler v.
Dixon' 6' and Buckley v. Wood.162 Cutler is noteworthy because the rationale
it offered for this rule was undoubtedly equally applicable to petitions to the
monarch:
It was adjudged, that if one exhibits articles to justices of peace
against a certain person, containing divers great abuses and
misdemeanors, not only concerning the petitioners themselves,
but many others, and all this to the intent that he should be bound
158. Foreswearing is false swearing; cozenage is cheating or defrauding a person by some
deceitful practice. BAu.,LrnNE's LAw DicTio4ARY 287, 492 (3d ed. 1969).
159. Hare v. Mellers Case, 3 Leon. 163, 163, 74 Eng. Rep. 607, 607-08. The same passage
is to be found in the report of this case at Hare & Meller's Case, 3 Leon. 138, 138, 74 Eng. Rep.
591,591.
160. In colonial times, and into the nineteenth century, colonial and the state legislatures
passed on many petitions to resolve disputes between private parties. Note, supra note 27, at
145-50.
161. 4 Co. Rep. 14b, 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B. 1585-86).
162. There are reports of this case at 4 Co. Rep. 14; Cro. Eliz. 230, 78 Eng. Rep. 486; and
Cro. Eliz. 248, 78 Eng. Rep. 503. There seem to have been a number of other, apparently
unreported decisions on this issue in the second half of the sLxteenth century. See Buckley v.
Wood, Cro. Eliz. 230-31, 78 Eng. Rep. 486 (Q.B. 1589-90); cf. Beauchamps v. Croft, 3 Dyer
285, 73 Eng. Rep. 639 (1569).
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to his good behaviour; in this case the party accused shall not have
for any matter contained in such articles any action upon the case,
for they have pursued the ordinary course ofjustice in such case:
and if actions should be permitted in such cases, those who have
just cause of complaint, would not dare to complain for fear of
infinite vexation. 163
Libel actions were prohibited, even against litigants whose allegedly libelous
statements had been made without 'Just cause," because permitting any
such suits would threaten, and deter, grievants who did have justification
for their complaints.
The phrase apparently coined in Cutler to describe the protected
proceedings, a "course of justice," was repeated in Buckley v. Wood, as it
would be in most decisions on the subject throughout the seventeenth
century:
[I]t was resolved.., that for any matter contained in the bill that
was examinable in the said Court, no action lies, although the
matter is merely false, because it was in course ofjustice .... [F]or
words not examinable in the said Court, an action on the case lies,
for that cannot be in a course of justice; for the Court has no
power or jurisdiction to do that which appertains to justice .... 164
Both the court and counsel seem to have assumed that the same immunity
rule would apply to civil and criminal libel actions. Although Buckley was a
civil proceeding, Wood's attorney argued that "the exhibiting of the bill is
only in course of justice, and concerneth himself only, and so is not
punishable."' 65 The court, in rejecting Wood's claim of immunity, noted
that the allegedly libelous statements had been made in a bill outside the
jurisdiction of Star Chamber, where it had been filed, and held that since
Wood had allegedly "exhibited the bill maliciously in slander of the plaintiff
for matters not examinable there, it is reason he should be punished.' 66
In 1623, the principle announced in Hare was sufficiently well estab-
lished that it was expressly accepted by the plaintiff in Tanfield v. Hiron.167
The alleged libel in Tanfield was contained in a document presented to the
Prince of Wales, a member of the House of Lords. The defendant asserted
that such documents were privileged. The plaintiff acknowledged that a
well framed petition could not provide a basis for a libel action, but argued
that the document in question was not privileged because, although
criticizing the plaintiff, it had failed to seek any specific redress:
163. Cutler v. Dixon, 4 Co. Rep. at 14b, 14, 76 Eng. Rep. 886, 886 (K.B. 1585-86) (footnotes
omitted).
164. Buckley v. Wood, 4 Co. Rep. 14, 76 Eng. Rep. 888, 889 (K.B. 1591-92) (footnotes
omitted). For examples of subsequent decisions using the phrase "course of justice," see, e.g.,
Anfield v. Feverhill, 2 Bulst. 269, 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1614) (citing Cutler); Weston v. Dobniet,
Cro. Jac. 432, 432, 79 Eng. Rep. 369, 369 (K.B. 1617) (referring to Cutler v. Dixon as "Dixie's
Case"); Hunter v. Allen, Palm. 188, 189, 81 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1035 (1612) ("le ordinary course
de justice") (citing Cutler); Wheeler and Appleton's Case, Godb. 339, 340, 78 Eng. Rep. 200,
200 (K.B. 1623) ("action will not lie (if) it is in the ordinary course of justice").
165. Buckley, Cro. Eliz. 248, 248, 78 Eng. Rep. 503, 503.
166. Id.
167. Godb. 405, 78 Eng. Rep. 239 (K.B. 1623).
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Action upon the Case, for delivering of a scandalous writing to the
Prince, accusing the plaintiff of injustice and oppressions. Defen-
dant pleaded, that oppressions were committed, etc. and that the
writing was delivered to the Prince, as a Peer of Parliament, in
order to procure redress, absque hoc, that it was delivered in any
other manner. Plaintiff demurred to this plea: it was insisted upon
in the argument of this case, that the writing, containing only
general matter of complaint, without any prayer for reformation,
was libellous, and, as it might procure the prince's ill-will to the
plaintiff, was therefore punishable .... 161
Another report of this case sets forth the plaintiff's argument in somewhat
greater detail:
Noy for the Plaintiff said, that . . . it is a grievous scandal to
deliver this writing; for it is a scandalous writing; and no petition:
for therein he doth not desire any Reformation, but complains
generally .... If he had demeaned himself as he ought, he ought
to have had the wrong (if there were any) reformed, and that he
did not do.... He hath not demeaned himself as he ought; for he
hath not desired in the letter any Reformation, but only he
complains of the oppression of Tanfield: he ought to have
directed the writing unto Parliament, and he directed the same
unto the Prince by name .... 1 6 9
Against this background, it is understandable why the prosecution in the
Seven Bishops Case would cleverly have omitted from the information the
salutation and prayer in the bishops' petition, and why counsel for the
bishops would have demanded that the petition be read in its entirety to the
jury.
In 1668-1669, one of the few attempts to found a libel claim on a
parliamentary petition occurred in a proceeding filed and litigated in the
House of Lords. Although the proceeding was ultimately unsuccessful, the
House of Commons regarded the possible precedent as so dangerous that
it insisted that all official reports of the action be destroyed.170 The dispute
began when officials of the East India Company seized a ship, cargo, and
house belonging to Thomas Skinner and allegedly assaulted Skinner in the
process. Skinner sued the East India company and Sir Samuel Barnar-
diston, who was governor of the company and a member of the House of
Commons. Skinner also took the unusual step of bringing his action as an
original proceeding in the House of Lords. In the seventeenth century, as
today, the House of Lords sat as England's highest appellate court; the
conduct there of actions nisi prius was, however, quite unusual. The Lords
nonetheless decided to give Skinner a hearing, and awarded him 5000
pounds in damages against the company. 17' This caused considerable
consternation in the House of Commons, because several members of the
Commons were also members of the company and-in an era before the
168. STATE LAW, OR THE DocrEiNE oF LIBELS 26 (2d ed.) (for date see infra note 217).
169. Godb. 405-07, 78 Eng. Rep. at 239-40.
170. 1 A. GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF CO.M.MONS FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694, at
150-211 (1769).
171. Id. at 150 & n.*.
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advent of limited liability companies-faced personal liability for the
judgment. Many members of Parliament regarded the award of damages as
a breach of their privileges as members of the House of Commons. 172
The matter took a new and considerably more ominous turn when
Barnardiston and the Company petitioned the House of Commons for
redress. This petition raised extraordinarily difficult questions about the
relationship between the two Houses of Parliament, each of which was
constitutionally independent of the other. On May 2, 1668, the House of
Commons adopted a resolution insisting that the action of the House of
Lords in awarding damages to Skinner was "not according to the Law of the
land."' 73 Lacking any direct manner of compelling the Lords to rescind
their order, the Commons then resolved that "Skinner, by commencing and
prosecuting suit, in the Lords House, and procuring judgment against the
Company, and the Governor, being a Member of this House, and several
Members of the House being parties concerned therein, is a breach of
privilege."' 74 The Sergeant at Arms of the House of Commons thereupon
took Skinner into custody. 175
The House of Lords responded by imprisoning and fining Barnar-
diston .176 The Lords founded their order for the arrest and punishment of
Barnardiston on a resolution that his petition to the House of Commons
was a libel. 177 The House of Lords apparently proceeded against Barnar-
diston under the medieval statute known as scandalum magnatum, which
declared it a crime to speak or write words in derogation of a peer, judge,
or high government official. ' 78 Parliament adjourned in mid-May 1668, not
returning until October of the next year. By late November 1669 cooler
heads prevailed in both Houses, and efforts began to find a solution to the
impasse. A member of the House of Lords apparently paid Barnardiston's
fine,179 and Sir Robert Carr suggested on the floor of the House of
Commons that the Lords were "ashamed" of their "proceedings against
Barnardiston."' 80 The Lords proposed the adoption of a bill clarifying their
authority to hear original proceedings, but the Commons, more concerned
with the libel charges founded on Barnardiston's petition, instead re-
quested a conference.' 81 The House of Commons, in preparation for that
conference, adopted a resolution setting forth the bases of its disagreement
with the action that had been taken by the Lords. All five paragraphs of that
172. See id. at 150-56.
173. Id. at 155.
174. Id. at 156.
175. Id. at 150 n.*, 156 editor's note.
176. Id. at 150 n.*, 205, 207. The Lords also imprisoned Sir Andrew Riccard, Rowland
Gwynn, and Christopher Boone, who had apparently joined in Barnardiston's petition. Id. at
150 n.*, 209.
177. Id. at 209 (quoted in text accompanying infra note 182), 210 (LordsJournal charged
Barnardiston and the others with "preparing, contriving, libelling and petitioning" (emphasis
omitted)). The Lords also condemned the proceeding of the Commons as illegal. Id. at 150 n.*.
178. See 3 W. BAcKSTONE, CommE-rApiEs *124-25. The original statute is None shall report
slanderous News, whereby Discord may arise, 3 Edw. I, ch. 34 (1275), reprinted in 1 Statutes at Large
97 (Pickering 1762).
179. A. GRuy, supra note 170, at 204-05.
180. Id. at 189.
181. Id. at 189, 204-08.
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resolution dealt with the petition issue, and referred to the power of courts
in libel actions because the House of Lords had acted against Barnardiston
in its judicial capacity.
1. That it is an inherent right of every commoner of England,
to prepare and present petitions to the House in case of grievance,
and of the House of Commons to receive them.
2. That it is the undoubted right and privilege of the House of
Commons, to adjudge and determine, touching the nature and
matter of such petitions, how far they are fit, and unfit, to be
received.
3. That no court whatsoever has power to judge or censure any
petition, prepared for and presented to the House of Commons,
[and received by them,] unless transmitted from thence, or the
matter complained of by them.
4. Whereas a petition, by the Governor and Company of
Merchants trading to the East Indies, was presented to the House
of Commons by Sir Samuel Barnardiston, and others, complain-
ing of grievances therein, which the Lords [have] censured as a
scandalous paper, or libel; the said censure and proceeding of the
Lords against [the said] Sir Samuel Barnardiston, are contrary to,
and in subversion of, the rights and privileges of the House of
Commons, and the Liberties of the Commons of England.
5. That the continuance, upon record, of the judgment given by
the Lords, and complained of by the House of Commons, in the
last session of this Parliament, in the case of Thomas Skinner, and
the East India Company, is prejudiced to the rights of the
commoners of England.18 2
These objectives rested not only on the freedom of commoners to petition,
but also on what we would today characterize as a matter of separation of
powers-an argument that the judicial branch of government (for it was in
its judicial capacity that the House of Lords had acted) could not interfere
in any way with the petitioning process that was critical to the work of the
legislative branch. Thus Solicitor Finch was referring to the House of
Commons, not to commoners, when he insisted "our inherent right in
Petitions is and will be eternally true."18 3 The resolution did not assert that
no sanction could ever be imposed on one who petitioned the Commons,
but insisted that only the House of Commons itself could do so. The specific
dispute between the Commons and Lords was finally resolved when, at the
suggestion of the King, both Houses agreed to erase from their journals all
references to the entire dispute. 8 4
By the time of Lake v. King, which was argued and decided over a
period of years from 1667 to 1671,185 the existence of an absolute privilege
182. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis omitted) (bracketed material in original).
183. Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 156 editor's note; see also id. at 189 n.t, 204 editor's note, 206-07, 209 n.*
(referring to the deletion of proceedings from the journals). Grey noted, however, that the
records of the proceedings are legible in the original journals. Id. at 156.
185. The earliest reported opinions in Lake v. King are dated in the Hilary term of the 19th
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for petitions was well established; indeed in Lake, as in Tanfield, the plaintiff
does not appear 'to have suggested otherwise. The allegedly libelous
document in Lake was a formal request for parliamentary redress, headed
"To the honourable the Committee of Parliament for Grievances, the
humble petition of Edward King."'1 6 The petition accused plaintiff Lake,
the vicar general to the Bishop of London, "of many horrible and great
abuses, such as extortion, oppression, vexation, and other misdemeanors in
his office;" Lake alleged in his libel complaint that King's charges were
"false and malicious."' 8 7 In response to the action, King insisted that the
document in question had been a petition to parliament, being careful to
allege, as would have been wise had the petition been part of a judicial
proceeding, that Parliament had authority to provide redress:
The defendant pleaded in bar... "that... he caused to be written
and engrossed the said petition ... and delivered the said petition,
containing the same matter as aforesaid, to a Committee then and
there constituted and appointed, by the commons then and there
assembled in Parliament, to hear and examine the grievances of
this realm of England, which said Committee then and there had
full power and authority to hear and examine grievances of this
kind ... -"188
Lake does not appear to have claimed that the mere submission of the
petition was actionable, even if done with malice; rather, the plaintiff
grounded his action on a complaint that King had "caused [the libel] to be
printed and delivered, published and dispersed to divers subjects."'18 9
Lake's attorney appears to have accepted the premise of Hare v. Mellers that
the principles applicable to petitions and legal proceedings were the same;
thus he argued, "It is true, if a man make a complaint in a legal way, no
action lieth against him for taking that course, if it be in a competent Court:
but that which we say is not lawful in this case, is his causing the matter to
be printed and published."'190 Lake's attorney contended that "although the
exhibiting of the said petition was lawful, yet the printing of it was a
publication of it to all the world, which is not lawful to be done in any case
.f. ior if it were, then, under a pretence of proceeding in a course of
justice, a libel might be printed, published, and disbursed of any man
throughout the whole kingdom, and yet he should have no remedy."' 91
The posture of the pleadings in Lake was such that the only question
was whether copies of a petition could with impunity be printed for, and
provided to, the various members of the parliamentary committee. The
court concluded that such publication was indeed privileged, but did not
and 20th years of the reign of Charles II, 1 Wms. Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137, and the last
to the Michaelmas term of the 23d year, 2 Kebl. 832, 84 Eng. Rep. 526. Charles II's regnal
years are treated as beginning in 1649. D. WALKER, supra note 123, at 1319. Thus, the date of
the cases are 1668-69 and 1671 respectively.
186. Lake v. King, 1 Wins. Saund. at 131, 85 Eng. Rep. at 138.
187. Id,
188, Id. at 132, 85 Eng. Rep. at 138.
189. Id. at 131, 85 Eng. Rep. at 138.
190, Lake v. King, 1 Mod, 58, 86 Eng. Rep. 729 (K.B. 1670).
191. Lake v. King, 1 Wms. Saund. at 132, 85 Eng. Rep. at 140.
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undertake to decide under what circumstances the petition might also have
been furnished to members of the public. In its decision the court noted:
[I]t was agreed that the exhibiting of the petition to a Committee
of Parliament was lawful, and that no action lies for it, although
the matter contained in the petition was false and scandalous,
because it is in a summary course of justice, and before those who
have power to examine, whether it be true or false. But the
question was, whether the printing and publishing of it, in the
manner alleged by the defendant in his plea, was justifiable or
not? 92
This characterization of parliamentary action on a grievance as a "course of
justice" was of particular significance, because the immunity accorded to
statements made in a judicial proceeding was premised on the character-
ization of such a proceeding as a "course of justice." The use of the same
phrase to refer to parliamentary as well as judicial actions signaled that both
were being accorded the same protection for a similar reason.
The decision in Lake v. King evidently reflected a broader consensus,
also apparent in the Seven Bishops Case, in opposition to the use of libel
actions against petitioners. The intensity of that consensus was revealed in
a somewhat extraordinary proceeding early in the reign of William and
Mary. In 1695 Thomas Kemp and several other hackney coachmen filed a
petition with the House of Commons setting forth several grievances
against certain Commissioners, particularly one Richard Gee, who were
responsible for licensing and regulating hackney coaches. Gee responded
by bringing a libel action against the petitioners, and had the defendants
arrested and required to post sureties for their appearance, as was possible
at common law when the amount sought in damages was ten pounds or
more.193 Kemp and his codefendants thereupon filed a second petition with
Parliament, complaining that Gee
by his declaration had call'd the petition (by them before pre-
sented) a libel, thereby arraigning the proceedings of the House,
and discouraging persons from seeking the redress of their
grievances; and they pray'd the protection of the House in the
premises: And the House referr'd the petition to the Committee
of Privileges and Elections, to examine the fact, and report the
same with their opinion.' 94
The Committee reported that Gee admitted "the arrest and declaration, but
confess'd that what he did was out of ignorance, and said 'twas only to
vindicate his own reputation."' 195 The Committee resolved "That Richard
Gee, Esq.; for prosecuting at Law the Hackney-Coachmen for Petitioning
the House, was guilty of a breach of Privilege;" the House agreed, and
ordered the Sergeant at Arms to take Gee into custody. 96
192. Id. at 132, 85 Eng. Rep. at 139.
193. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Cox,.irEAiuEs *287.
194. The proceeding is summarized in ANONYMOUS, ASHBY AND WHrrE, OR THE GREAT QUESTION
255-56 (1705).
195. Id. at 256.
196. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Although it is unclear how long Gee was imprisoned, the arrest of one
such libel plaintiff for trying to found a libel suit on a petition evidently
proved sufficient, as an eighteenth-century English author subsequently
observed, to put "a stop ... to all such proceedings for the future."1 97 This
appears to be one of the few instances in English constitutional history in
which an individual was actually incarcerated for attempting to interfere
with a liberty later embodied in the American Bill of Rights. 198 So far as can
be ascertained, between the arrest of Gee in 1695 and the framing of the
first amendment a century later, no one in England or the colonies dared
to risk Gee's fate by filing a libel action based on the contents of a petition.
In the decades following Gee's incarceration, on the other hand,
plaintiffs did make several unsuccessful efforts to found libel actions on
statements occurring in the course of judicial proceedings. In one instance,
the King's Bench based the immunity for judicial proceedings on the
decision in Lake v. King according absolute immunity to petitions, reason-
ing, as had Hare v. Mellers, that the protections for petitions and judicial
proceedings were the same. In Astley v. Younge, 19 9 decided in 1759, the
plaintiff alleged that in an earlier proceeding Edward Younge, the libel
defendant, "did wickedly and maliciously make, exhibit and publish to the
... Court of our lord the King before the King himself, a certain malicious,
false and scandalous libel, contained in a certain affidavit in writing of him
the said Edward. '200 Younge's alleged libel was his assertion that Astley's
own statements in that earlierjudicial proceeding were untrue. Astley based
his subsequent libel action on a claim that the charge of perjury had not
been made by Younge for the purpose of winning that earlier lawsuit, but
merely "to asperse" Astley. 20 1 In rejecting Astley's libel claim, Lord Mans-
field assured defense counsel that oral argument was unnecessary because
"the matter was so plain." 20 2 The first case cited by Mansfield, in awarding
judgment for the defendant, was Lake v. King:
In the case of Lake v. King... the matter charged as the
foundation of that action, (which was an action upon the case for
printing and publishing a scandalous libel upon the plaintiff,) was
contained in a petition to a committee of Parliament for griev-
ances, exhibited in a Court of Justice.[20 3] It was agreed "that no
action lay for exhibiting the petition, (which was lawful,) although
the matter contained in it was false and scandalous: because it was
in a summary Court of Justice, and before those who had power
to examine whether it was true or false:" and judgment was given
for the defendant .... 204
197. Id.
198. STATE LAW, OR THE DOCTRINE OF LIBELS 70-71 (2d ed.) (for date see infra note 217).
199. 2 Burr. 807, 97 Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B. 1759-60).
200. Id. at 808, 97 Eng. Rep. at 573.
201. Id. at 809, 97 Eng. Rep. at 574.
202. Id. at 810, 97 Eng. Rep. at 574.
203. It is likely that what Mansfield said was not "Court of Justice" but "course ofjustice."
For a discussion of the significance of the "course of justice," see supra text accompanying
notes 161-65.
204. Astley v. Young, 2 Burr. at 810-11, 97 Eng. Rep. at 574 (citations omitted).
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The court emphasized that Younge's statements were 'Justified," not
because Younge might have had reason to believe Astley was a liar, but
because the mere fact that the disputed statement had been made in a
judicial proceeding constituted legal justification. Therefore, the court
reasoned, Astley's allegation that Younge had acted with malice was
immaterial, "for if the matter is not actionable, the manner is of no
consequence." 205
In sum, pre-1797 decisions provide precisely what the Supreme Court
in McDonald asserted did not exist-"dear evidence of the nature of the
right to petition as it existed at the time the first amendment was
adopted. °206 Entirely absent from these decisions was what the Supreme
Court believed could be found in subsequent nineteenth-century cases, any
"conflicting views of the privilege afforded expressions in petitions to
government officials. '207 If there is any uncertainty regarding what would
have occurred had a case like McDonald v. Smith been brought in England
in 1791, it could only be about whether or not Mr. Smith would have been
imprisoned by the Sergeant at Arms for having had the effrontery to
interfere with the petitioning process. The last person prior to 1791 to
assert that such suits were maintainable quickly confessed to Parliament
that he had acted out of "ignorance"; 208 the Supreme Court's decision some
three centuries later appears to have a similar foundation.
IV. TREATISES
The holding of Lake v. King, according to petitions the same absolute
privilege afforded to statements in judicial proceedings, was widely re-
counted in eighteenth-century legal treatises. Many of these treatises were
found in colonial libraries and certainly were familiar to the framers of the
Constitution. As the following survey shows, treatise writers throughout the
eighteenth century not only regarded Lake as good law, but also interpreted
Lake as insulating from libel actions even deliberate falsehoods contained in
petitions.
Knightley D'Anvers's General Abridgment, first printed in 1705, ob-
served:
If A. exhibits a petition to a Committee of Parliament appointed
for the examination of publick grievances, and therein charges B.
being a Doctor of Law and Vicar-General to the Bishop of L. with
several great offenses, as extortion, etc., in his office, and for the
better manifestation of these grievances, causes the said petition
to be printed, and to be delivered to several members of the said
committee, yet no action upon the case lies; for this printing and
delivering of the case as aforesaid, is according to the order and
course of proceeding in Parliament.20 9
For D'Anvers the only uncertain question at issue in Lake was whether the
205. Id. at 812, 97 Eng. Rep. at 575.
206. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
207. Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
209. 1 K. D'ANVERs, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE CoNimox LAw 196 (1705).
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defendant could with impunity print and distribute multiple copies of his
petition; D'Anvers simply took for granted, as had the court in Lake itself,
that the original copy of that petition was itself absolutely privileged.
William Bohun's 1713 practice manual, An Introduction to the Study and
Practice of the Laws of England, devoted several paragraphs to summarizing
Lake v. King:
The Plaintiff declared for printing and publishing a scandalous
libel in hac Forma, To the Honourable the Committee of Parlia-
ment for Grievances, the humble petition of E. K. Etc., ad Damp.
2000 [pounds]. To which the defendant pleaded a justification:
And the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joins.
(1) It was agreed, that the exhibiting the petition to the
Committee was legal, and that no action lay, though the matter in
the petition was false and scandalous, because exhibited in a
Course of Justice, and before those that had power to examine
whether or not.
(2) And as to the charge of printing, publishing and dispersing
it, the Court held, that it was the order and course of proceeding
in Parliament, to print and deliver copies of petitions [to members
of the committee]. 210
The absolute immunity extended to remarks by an attorney during the
course of a trial was mentioned as a "Note" to the summary of Lake.
211
William Hawkins's Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, printed in 1716,
cited Lake as the source for its summary and explanation of the law:
[I]t hath been resolved, that no false or scandalous matter
contained in a petition to a committee of Parliament, or in articles
of the Peace exhibited to Justices of Peace, or in any other
proceeding in a regular Course ofJustice, will make the complaint
amount to a libel; for it would be a great discouragement to suitors
to subject them to publick prosecutors, in respect of their appli-
cations to a Court of Justice. And the chief intention of the law in
prohibiting persons to revenge themselves by libels, or any other
private matter, is to restrain them from endeavouring to make
themselves their own judges, and to oblige them to refer the
decision of their grievances, to those whom the law has appointed
to determine them.212
Hawkins, like the court in Lake, subsumed both petitions and court actions
under the general rubric of "proceedings in the course of justice." This
treatment of the issue in Pleas of the Crown is of particular importance
because Hawkins's book was one of the most widely used legal tracts in the
eighteenth century. 213
210. W. BOHUN, Isgrrruno LEGALIS: OR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF THE LAWS
oF ENOLAND 310-11 (1713).
211. Id. at 311.
212. 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 194 (1716) (footnotes omitted).
213. H. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN AMERICAN LIBRARIES 1700-
1799, at xi, 62 (1978).
74 IOWA LAW REVIEW 303
Thomas Wood's 1724 An Institute of the Laws of England, also widely
circulated in the colonies, 2 14 contains a somewhat more obscure summary
of the law:
False or scandalous matter in a legal proceeding in a regular
course of justice (as by bill of complaint, petition, articles, etc.) will
not amount to a libel, if the court, or the person applied to, hath
jurisdiction of the cause. 21 5
This would probably have been understood as encompassing petitions for
redress of grievances, both because it expressly includes petitions, and
because it refers to applications to persons as well as applications to courts,
although the matter is not free of doubt.2 16
The anonymous State Law, or the Doctrine ofLibels, first printed between
1726 and 1734,217 was quite unambiguous, providing a two-page summary
of Lake v. King and noting the somewhat different accounts of the case in
the various reports: 218
An action was brought for publishing a libel; the publication was,
in delivering several printed papers, in which the plaintiff was
slandered, to several members of the House of Commons....
[T]he case was, that the defendant had petitioned the House
against the plaintiff, and that those Papers were only Copies of his
petition for the members information.... [']]he Court adjudged
this publication lawful, and gave judgment for the defendant.2 19
State Law suggested that the lawsuits such as that brought by Lake "will
never come into practice again," because "a stop has been put to all such
proceedings in the future"220 by of the action of Parliament against Gee.
A New Abridgment of the Law by Matthew Bacon, originally printed in
1736-66 and found in many colonial law libraries, 22' squarely argued that
the absolute privilege accorded to petitions, which was recognized in Lake,
was but an application of the same principle that gave rise to the privilege
for judicial proceedings:
4. Whether any proceedings in a Court of Justice will amount to a libel.
It seems to be clearly agreed, that no proceeding in a regular
Course of Justice will make the complaint amount to a libel; for it
would be a great discouragement to suitors to subject them to
public prosecutions, in respect of their applications to a Court of
Justice; and the chief intention of the law in prohibiting persons
214. Id. at 56-57.
215. T. Woo, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 431 (1724).
216. Wood notes that certain proceedings in chancery were commenced by petition. Id. at
19, 533.
217. State Law, or the Doctrine of Libels contains no date of publication, but the era in which
it was printed can be deduced from its dedication in the preface to Solicitor General Talbot.
Sir Charles Talbot served as Solicitor General from 1726-1734. D. WALKER, supra note 123, at
1334.
218, See supra note 185.
219. STATE LAW, OR THE DocnINE OF LiBELS 34-35; see also id. at 70 (noting reports of Lake v.
King differ, but ultimately hold publication of petition is lawful).
220. Id. at 70.
221. H. JoHNsoN, supra note 213, at 5, 59.
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to revenge themselves by libels, or any other private manner, is to
restrain them from endeavouring to make themselves their own
judges, and to oblige them to refer the decision of their grievances
to those whom the law has appointed to determine them. Therefore
it hath been resolved, that no false or scandalous matter contained
in (a) a petition to a committee of Parliament, or in (b) articles of
the peace exhibited to Justices of the Peace, are libelious.222
In a footnote, Bacon cited Lake v. King and Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown to
support his view of the privilege accorded to petitions. 223
Charles Viner's General Abridgement of Law and Equity, first published in
1742-53 and found in numerous colonial law libraries, 224 also included an
account of Lake v. King:
The printing of a charge of extortion in his office, against the
vicar general of the bishop of L. and delivering it to several
members of the committee of parliament for examination of
grievances is justifiable; but if he had delivered it to others it had
been otherwise; and the printing them, which is a publishing of
them to the printers and composers, is not so great a publication,
as to have so many copies transcribed by several clerks .... Lake
v. King.225
Viner noted that Hawkins had accepted Lake as authoritative. 226 Viner
referred to the privilege extended to statements in judicial proceedings only
in a side note commenting on Lake.
John Raynor's 1765227 A Digest of the Law Concerning Libels discussed
Lake v. King immediately following its summary of the privilege accorded to
judicial proceedings. Raynor'sjuxtaposition suggested that the rationale for
the privilege accorded to judicial proceedings applied equally to statements
in petitions, and thus explained the holding of Lake v. King:
It seems to be clearly agreed, that no proceedings in a regular
Course of Justice will make the complaint amount to a Libel; for
it would be a great discouragement to suitors to subject them to
public prosecutions, in respect of their applications to a Court of
Justice; and the chief intention of the Law in prohibiting persons
to revenge themselves by libels, or any other private manner, is to
restrain them from endeavouring to make themselves their own
judges, and to oblige them to refer the decision of their grievances
to those whom the Law has appointed to determine them. 3 Bac.
Abr. 494.
The printing [of] a charge of extortion in his office, against the
Vicar General of the Bishop of L. and delivering it to several
members of the Committee of Parliament for the Examination of
Grievances, is justifiable; but if he had delivered it to others, it had
222. 3 M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 494 (4th ed. 1778).
223. Id. at 494 n.b (citing Lake v. King, 4 Co. Rep. 14; 1 W. HAWKINs, supra note 212, at 194).
224. H. JOHNSON, supra note 213, at 59.
225. C. VINER, GENERAL ABRIDGEMrNT OF LAW AND EQUITY 85 (2d ed. 1793) (emphasis omitted).
226. Id.
227. There is also a 1778 edition.
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been otherwise; and the printing them, which is a publishing of
them to the printers and composers, is not so great a publication,
as to have so many copies transcribed by several clerks .... Lake
v. King.
The above case of Lake v. King is reported by so many, and so
differently, that it is with difficulty we learn, that it was adjudged
for the Defendant . . . [A] Stop has been put to all such
proceedings for the future, by the interposition of Commons: They
resolved that all petitions to them were lawful, or at least only
punishable by themselves, by the Vote of the 9th of February 8 W.
3 in the case of Kemp v. Gee, in which Gee is voted guilty of a breach
of privilege, in suing Kemp and others for a libel, which supposed
libel was contained in a petition by them presented to the House
for redress of grievances. 228
Raynor's commentary is taken almost verbatim from earlier treatises; the
first paragraph from Bacon and Hawkins, 22 9 the second from Viner,230 and
the third from State Law.235
Francis Buller's Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius,
published in 1773, treated Lake as announcing a general principle of which
the immunity for remarks made in the course of a trial was only one of
several applications:
In Lake and King, (which was an Action for printing a Libel suite)
it was holden that an action would not lie for printing a petition to
Parliament, and delivering it to the members, it being agreeable to
the course and proceedings in Parliament. And Cutler and Dixon 4
Co. 14.,[232] is to the S.P33
"To the S.P." appears to mean to the same point. As was noted earlier,234
Cutler v. Dixon was an unsuccessful libel action founded on articles pre-
sented to justices of the peace in an attempt to have Cutler bound to his
good behavior.235
Finally, Isaac Espinasse's 1790 Digest placed the holding of Lake v. King
under a general rule regarding legal proceedings:
But nothing shall be construed a libel which is necessary in the
228. J. RAYNOR, A DIGEST OF THE LAw CONCERNING LIBELS 17-18 (1765). The citation to "Bac.
Abr." is to Matthew Bacon's New Abridgement of the Law. See supra text accompanying notes
221-23.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13, 221-23.
230. See supra text accompanying note 225.
231. See supra text accompanying note 219.
232. Cutler v. Dixon, 4 Co. Rep. 14b, 14, 76 Eng. Rep. 886, 886 (K.B. 1586).
233. F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATnVE TO TRIA4sAT Nisi PRius 6 (4th ed. 1785).
The first edition was printed 1733.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
235. Cutler v. Dixon, 4 Co. Rep. 14b, 14, 76 Eng. Rep. 886, 886 ("In this case the party
accused shall not have for any matter contained in such Articles any action upon the case, for
they have pursued the ordinary course of justice in such case: and if actions should be
permitted in such cases, those who have just cause of complaint, would not dare to complain
for fear of infinite vexation.").
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course of legal proceedings, and is relevant to the matter which is
before the court.
As where the plaintiff declared, "That he being a doctor of laws,
and vicar general to the Bishop of Lincoln, that the defendant had
presented, and caused to be printed a petition to parliament,
charging him with divers crimes; as extortion, oppression, and
corruption in his office:" the action was held not to lie, the petition
being the necessary and usual mode of complaint to parliament
for any redress of grievance....
6. So no matter which is stated in any memorial or petition for the
redress of grievances, and addressed in the proper channel, by which such
redress may be had; that is, to the persons only who have power to
give such redress, shall be deemed libelous.236
A side note indicated that the case referred to was of course Lake v. King.
Although published shortly before the framing of the first amendment,
Espinasse's Digest evidently reached the United States with dispatch; the
Yale Law School library possesses a copy of the 1790 edition which bears
the signature of Roger Sherman, a member of the 1787 constitutional
convention who served in the House from 1789-91 and in the Senate from
1791 until his death in 1793.
V. THE MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT PETITION CLAUSE
In 1791 there was a well-established common-law rule barring libel
actions based on the contents of a petition. That rule had been constantly
reiterated in judicial opinions and legal treatises for over a century. At the
end of the eighteenth century not a single commentator or reported
decision questioned in any way the holding of Lake v. King. Had McDonald
written his letter opposing the nomination of Smith to President Washing-
ton or to George III, rather than to President Reagan, a libel action by
Smith would have been dismissed out of hand.237
Viewed from an historical perspective, the common-law prohibition
against libel actions founded on petitions was not a particular application of
a more general free speech principle, but the result of institutional
considerations at least as relevant today as they were three centuries ago. In
England petitions and lawsuits were regarded as simply two different ways
in which an aggrieved subject might request redress from the government.
Although one could conceivably disagree about whether libel suits would
impermissibly deter such requests, the common-law rule appears to have
236. 2 I. ESPINASSE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TLs AT Nisi PI'us 505-06 (2d ed.
1793). The first edition was printed in 1790.
237. The decision in McDonald did not purport to reconsider the previous rule that testimony
before a legislative committee is absolutely privileged. See Comment, A Qualified Privilege for
Defamatory Nontestimonial Communications Made in the Course of Petitioning, 12 WM. MrrcHELL L.
Rav. 769, 770-71 & n.12 (1986) (citing cases). If that rule still applies, McDonald means that an
already overburdened Congress can only get access to controversial information by holding a
formal hearing. A dtizen with information of importance to Congress may have to visit
Washington in person in order to avoid the risk of a libel suit, and such a potential witness, like
Colonel Oliver North, must refuse to tell a congressional committee or staff what he or she has
to say until called before a formal meeting of the committee.
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been virtually unchallenged. Legal writers regarded any distinction be-
tween libel rules for petitions and for judicial proceedings as making no
more sense than separate libel rules for statements made in actions on the
case and statements made in actions in trespass. Ironically, even White v.
Nicholls acknowledged, indeed premised its holding on, the principle that
petitions and lawsuits should be governed by the same libel doctrines; the
existence of different constitutional standards for petitions and lawsuits did
not emerge until the 1986 decision in McDonald itself.
The inevitable effect of a distinction between petitions and judicial
proceedings is to encourage, at times perhaps even compel, grievants with
serious but potentially libelous complaints to file lawsuits rather than seek
redress from elected officials. If McDonald could have concocted a relevant
albeit far-fetched legal theory, he might with impunity have filed a federal
lawsuit seeking to enjoin Smith's appointment, rather than risk financial
disaster by taking the traditional course of writing to the President and
Congress. Under the decision in McDonald, individuals who feel they have
been mistreated by an IRS agent or a police officer must think twice before
complaining to the officer's superiors, but have no similar reason to hesitate
about taking the matter to court. Coming from a Supreme Court which
repeatedly has insisted that grievants ought address their grievances to
legislative and executive officials, rather than bring them to federal judges,
the incentives created by McDonald seem perverse indeed.
The Parliament of 1669 also recognized an institutional problem that
is today uniquely relevant to the American federal system. If a petitioner
can be mulct in damages for an allegedly libelous petition, the governmen-
tal body which passes on the merits of libel claims will have a direct and
potentially decisive ability to restrict the flow of information to the officials
who would otherwise receive such petitions. The problem in 1669, of
course, was interference by the House of Lords with petitions to the House
of Commons. In our own times, similar difficulties could arise in other
ways. Had it ever occurred to racist southern officials that they could bring
state libel actions against blacks who complained to the Justice Department
or to Congress about racial discrimination, such lawsuits-if permitted by
the Supreme Court-would have been a potent weapon in the hands of
state officials determined to obstruct federal desegregation efforts. It would
be equally intolerable if state courts had the power to impose substantial
libel verdicts on defendants because they had complained to federal
authorities about the failure of state officials to comply with federal
environmental, safety, or other laws. Although it is difficult to imagine
federal judges attempting to protect their own interests by punishing
complaints submitted to the other branches of the national government, the
federal courts might well be dragooned into doing so by other disgruntled
federal officials. If, for example, Robert Bork were to bring a libel action
against those who testified or lobbied against his nomination to the
Supreme Court, judges might well find themselves in the constitutionally
impossible position of being required to decide in that lawsuit whether the
charges against Bork, although generally believed by the Senate and indeed
the American public, were in reality false and utterly baseless. The wisdom
of the common-law rule and of the resolution of 1669 is that they prevent
such institutional conflicts from arising.
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The majority and concurring opinions in McDonald v. Smith suggest
that, by placing the rights to freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, and
petitioning in the same amendment, Congress intended the first amend-
ment to afford comparable degrees of protection to each of those rights.238
This syntactical argument is far too weak to support the extraordinary
conclusion that the framers actually wanted to reduce the scope of the then
existing right to petition. It is virtually inconceivable that the framers
intended to afford American citizens a lesser degree of protection if they
complained to the President or Congress than the Colonists had enjoyed
when, as British subjects, they complained to the King or Parliament. None
of the states which proposed the adoption of a federal petition clause
suggested that it be linked to freedom of speech.23 9 In the state bills of
rights, state petition clauses were always set forth separately from provi-
sions regarding freedom of speech or freedom of the press.240 It is not to be
believed that Congress intended the federal Bill of Rights to afford a lesser
degree of protection to a petition submitted to the federal government than
was accorded by state constitutions to a similar petition submitted to state
officials. It is even less likely that Congress sought, through the seemingly
benign device of locating the petition clause in a guarantee with other
rights, coyly to emasculate the rights requested by several states.2 4 1 Indeed,
there is absolutely no contemporaneous history suggesting that anyone
connected with the framing and approval of the petition clause harbored
any objection to or intended any limitation on the right to petition as it had
existed under English law prior to the Revolution and as it continued in the
several states.
There is in the structure of the first amendment a change of significance
to Lake v. King, but not the alteration suggested by the Supreme Court in
McDonald. Lake v. King, it will be recalled, left some doubt regarding
whether a petition would be protected if its contents were shown to anyone
other than an official with authority to provide the requested redress, and
other cases suggested that such broader distribution might well subject the
petitioner to an action for libel.242 In the Seven Bishops Case, on the other
hand, the Crown did not argue that the bishops had "published" the
allegedly libelous petition by showing it to one another, and no judicial
decision suggested that the distribution of a petition to fellow petitioners
238. 472 U.S. at 485; id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
239. The state resolutions are set forth in 3 B. SCHWARTZ, THE RooTs OF THE BILL oF RIGHTS
(1980). For examples, see 3 id. at 681 (Massachusetts); 4 id. at 735 (Maryland); 4 id. at 842
(Virginia); 4 id. at 913 (New York); 4 id. at 968 (North Carolina).
240. The state petition clauses are set forth in 2 id. at 266 (Pennsylvania) (freedom of speech
and press in section xii; right to petition in section xvi), at 277-78 (Delaware) (right to petition
in section 9; free press in section 23), at 287 (North Carolina) (free press in section xv; right
to petition in section xvii), at 324 (Vermont) (freedom of speech and press in section xiv; right
to petition in section xviii), at 372-73 (Massachusetts) (freedom of speech and press in section
xvii; right to petition in section xx), and at 378-79 (New Hampshire) (free press in section xxii;
right to petition in section xxxii).
241. The free speech and petition clauses were not grouped together in Madison's initial
draft of the Bill of Rights. 1 AxxALS Or Coxo. 494 (. Gales ed. 1789) (comments by James
Madison on June 8, 1789, in House of Representatives), reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, TE BIu. or
RIGHTs: A DOCUNMExTARY HISTORY 1026 (1971).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
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could impair the immunity of the petition signers. Indeed, Lake itself
recognized that the petitioning process would at times involve some
disclosure to individuals other than the recipient officials, noting that a
petitioner might employ a clerk to prepare by hand additional copies. But
the significance of that acknowledgment in Lake and the Seven Bishops Case
was limited by the 1661 English statute which provided that, absent special
governmerlt approval, no more than twenty individuals might be asked to
sign certain petitions. It was no coincidence that the petition in the Seven
Bishops Case, although purporting to seek redress for all church officials,
was signed by only seven of them, and not by any significant proportion of
the hundreds of clerics actually affected and, presumably, aggrieved.
The Supreme Court wrote in McDonald that the right to petition was
under "attack" in England in "the 1790's"243 because a statute adopted in
1795 established limits on petitioning similar to those of the 1661 law.2 44
What the Court failed to recognize, however, was that the first amendment
was framed to prevent the imposition of precisely such restrictions on the
number of people who could sign or support a petition. The punctuation
and particular phrasing of the amendment is of substantial importance:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances. 245
Speech and press seem on the face of the amendment to be interrelated,
being set off by semicolons; peaceably assembly and petitioning are,
similarly, grouped together. More importantly, however, the last phrase
refers to "the right," not "the rights" "peaceably to assemble, and to
petition." The word "right" is in the singular, a choice which indicates that
the framers in this phrase were concerned not with assembly as a general-
ized liberty, although such a guarantee may well be inherent in the free
speech clause,2 46 but with assemblies that were part of the petitioning
process. In England prior to the adoption of the 1661 statute,247 as was true
during the abolitionist petition campaigns before the Civil War,2 48 the
process of soliciting petition signatures and support was utilized as a critical
opportunity to win over the public to the cause of the petition. An assembly
calling for a change in government policy, be it a rally at Madison Square
Garden or a march along Pennsylvania Avenue, is as sacrosanct a part of
the petitioning process under the first amendment as were the private
discussions between the Archbishop Canterbury and his colleagues in the
243. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 n.5 (citing I. BRAin, THE BiLL cF lRGTrrs 245 (1965)); cf. Smith,
supra note 1, at 1187 & n.203 ("common law development for the Bill of Rights cuts off in
1791").
244. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1159, 1186-87. That 1661 law was still in effect in the
eighteenth century. Id. at 1159, 1163-65.
245. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
246. There is considerable evidence indicating the framers held that view. See Smith, supra
note 1, at 1175.
247. Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 571-72 n.14
(1987).
248. W. WIECEK, supra note 27, at 184.
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Church of England. The phrasing of the amendment undoubtedly reflects
an intent to prohibit measures, such as the 1661 statute, severely limiting
the number of individuals who could join in or present a petition, and to
place within the protections of the petition clause, including the protections
it afforded against libel actions, any peaceable concerted speech or action
taken to influence the course of government conduct.2 49
VI. CONCLUSION
The sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century materials set
forth above demonstrate with unusual clarity that the Supreme Court's
decision in McDonald v. Smith yielded a result almost certainly contrary to
the framers' intent concerning the petition clause. If, in the fullness of time,
the Supreme Court adopts an interpretation of the clause consistent with its
historical background, there will be, as the Court seems to have understood
in McDonald, major changes in the constitutional aspects of libel law.2 50 But
249. All of the state guarantees of the right to petition contained a similar reference to the
right of peaceable assembly. None of the state guarantees of freedom of speech referred to
freedom of assembly. See supra note 240.
Blackstone's Commentaries, although making no specific mention of the libel problem,
emphasized that under English law restrictions on petitioning were limited to the manner of
petitioning, rather than imposing any sanctions based on the claims of a petition if they proved
incorrect:
If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of... rights... which
the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a... right,
appertaining to every individual . . . of petitioning the king, or either house of
parliament, for the redress of grievances. In Russia, we are told that the czar Peter,
established a law, that no subject might petition the throne, till he had first petitioned
two different ministers of state. In case he obtained justice from neither, he might
then present a third petition to the prince; but upon pain of death, if found to be in
the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one dared to offer such third
petition; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the sovereign, he had little
opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon
petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and while they promote
the spirit of peace, there are no check upon that of liberty. Care only must be taken,
lest, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of riot or tumult; as
happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and, to prevent this,
it is provided by the [1661] statute 13 Car. II. [sess. 1, ch. 5] that no petition to the
king, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall be
signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter therefor be approved by three
justices of the peace, or the major part of the grandjury... nor shall any petition be
presented by more than ten persons at a time. But, under these regulations, it is
declared by the [1689 Bill of Rights] that the subject hath a right to petition ....
1 W. BLAcrSroNE, CoM.M.ENrARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 142-43 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803)
(footnotes omitted).
St. George Tucker, the editor of the 1803 American edition of Commentaries, added a
footnote to Blackstone's description of the constraints imposed by the 1661 statute, observing
that "[tihe right of petitioning is not subject to any limitation or restriction in the United
States." Id. at 143 n.39.
250. The absolute immunity that would exist under the petition clause would be limited to
statements seeking or arguably directed at eliciting some action or redress by the government,
or encouraging others to seek such action or redress. This charge would be a more modest one
than Professor Meiklejohn's proposal for absolute immunity for all comments on public
affairs. Meiklejohn, Public Speech and Libel Litigation: Are They Compatible?, 14 HoFSTRA L. REv.
547, 548 (1986).
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there are broader lessons to be learned as well. In response to conservative
demands for greater emphasis on the intent of the framers, liberals have
sensibly insisted that the framers often did not have, indeed could not have
had, any specific intent with regard to many of the problems faced by the
courts in the late twentieth century. Throughout this debate, however, all
parties seem to have assumed that greater fidelity to the intent of the
framers would result in a narrowing of the constitutional protections
currently recognized by the Supreme Court; in this instance, at least,
precisely the opposite is the case.
The outcome in McDonald also demonstrates the practical difficulties
inherent in attempting to base twentieth-century judicial opinions on
eighteenth-century law. The lawyers and judges who participate in cases
such as this are trained as lawyers and judges, not historians; they are
conversant with the contents and methodology of United States Reports
and LEXIS, not with English Reprints or Viner's Abridgement. There are a
few dozen legal historians in the United States or Great Britain who might
have known what authorities to consult to ascertain whether Lake v. King
was good law in 1791, but practicing lawyers and busy judges are not a great
deal more likely to be conversant with such materials than they would be to
understand the state of anthropology or etymology in the late eighteenth
century. The actual brief for petitioner in McDonald was, as briefs go, quite
scholarly; yet, perhaps understandably, none of the briefs referred to Hare,
Tanfield, Astley v. Younge, or the case of Kemp and Gee, to any of the
relevant eighteenth-century legal treatises, or to the detailed arguments in
the Seven Bishops Case.251 McDonald was argued on March 20, 1985, and
decided ninety-one days later.25 2 The Court had little time for research of
its own, and evidently did none; the majority opinion cites only six
pre-twentieth-century authorities, and all of them were mentioned in the
briefs of the parties.253 Indeed, there is good reason to doubt whether
anyone on the Court ever actually read Lake v. King, because the Court's
opinion, carrying forward an error evidently taken from the briefs of the
parties, incorrectly dates that decision in 1680.254
25 1. The only mention of the report in Howell's State Trials was to the jury instructions of
Justice Allybone. Brief for Petitioner at 15, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (No. 84-
476).
252. June 19, 1985.
253, Compare McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482 (citing 1689 Bill of Rights and 4 PaR.. DEB. (1st ser.
Cobbett) (1669)) with Brief for Petitioner, at 13-14 (same citation); compare McDonald, 472 U.S.
at 483 n.4 (citing Lake v. King) with Brief for Petitioner, at 15, 19, 22 (same citation); compare
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 n.5 (citing summary of late eighteenth century legislation in I.
BRAr, THE BLu. OF RIGMs (1965)) with Brief for Petitioner, at 19 n.34 (same citation); compare
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482 (citing 1765 resolution of the Stamp Act Congress) with Brief for
Petitioner, at 16 n.25 (same citation); compare McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483 (citing 1776
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights) with Brief for Petitioner, at 18, 24 (same citation); compare
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738) with Brief for Petitioner, at 26 (same
citation).
254. Compare McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483 n.4 (citing Lake v. King, 1 Wins. Saund. 131, 85
Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1680)) with Brief for Petitioner at vii, 15 and Brief for Respondent at v,
22 (citing as Lake v. King, I Saund. 131 (1680)). The particular report cited by the parties and
the Court is that in 1 Wins. Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B.), which reports decisions from
the 19th and 20th years of the reign of Charles II. Charles I's first regnal year was 1649,
although the Interregnum did not end until 1660; thus the 19th and 20th years are 1667-68.
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The extent to which the interpretation of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights should turn on the intent of the framers is, and will remain, a matter
of considerable disagreement. But if, as is surely the case, that intent is to
have any role in constitutional adjudication, the Supreme Court must be
sensitive to the danger that attorneys and judges alike will lack the expertise
necessary to canvass fully the relevant historical materials. The Court has
several available approaches for dealing with this potential problem. The
Court can, in an appropriate case, request the views of the Solicitor General
or another amicus, and, given sufficient time, might undertake to research
issues not sufficiently addressed by the parties. The problems involved may
not be insolvable, but the Court ought bear in mind, when faced with a case
turning on such historical matters, that the information that results from
the normal adversarial process may at times be insufficient to provide a
basis for a sound opinion.
The date of 1680 was evidently arrived at by making two distinct errors: first, assuming the
regnal years commence at the end of the Interregnum, and second, adding 20 to the
commencement date, thus failing to count the first year of Charles's reign. Even if Charles had
became King in May of 1660, 1680 would be the 21st year of his reign, not the 20th. It is
unlikely that the Court, by coincidence, made on its own the same errors as counsel. See
generally GUIDE TO LAw REPORrS AND STATLTrES 66-67 (3d. ed. 1959) (containing table of regnal
years of English sovereigns).
Similarly, counsel for petitioner, referring to late eighteenth-century English restrictions on
petitioning, cited I. BRa. -r, THE BILL OF RIGHrs 245 (1965). Brief for Petitioner, at 19 n.34. The
material referred to is actually on page 244. The McDonald Court also mistakenly cites page
245 rather than page 244. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 n.5.

